Page 220 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

722 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

As Tall ‘Afar slid back into chaos, the insurgents targeted Iraqi security forces and
other symbols of government authority. Their attacks thoroughly cowed a police force,
once hundreds strong. through their repeated attacks on stations, the insurgents confined
the remaining police to the Ottoman fortress overlooking the city. Amjad Hashem Taki, a
captain in the police force, reported in January 2005 that “400 [Sunni] officers… quit or
joined the insurgency,” while noting that US forces were responsible for about 90 percent
of all security operations. Another Shiite policeman, Hasanen Khidir, recalled that the
insurgents subjected the police to constant small arms and RPG attacks. Surrounded by
Sunni Turkmen and terrorized by the insurgents, the Shiite policemen rarely ventured out
of the castle, except as death squads to exact retribution through kidnappings, executions,
committing “atrocities and injustices,” and contributing to a larger “cycle of… tribal
violence which further destabilized the city and further victimized the people.” 14
Insurgents exploited the thinly spread US forces, making Tall ‘Afar the centerpiece
in their propaganda campaign following the fall of Fallujah. On a regular basis, their
attacks against American patrols and convoys “featured heavily in the ‘top 10 attacks’
videos circulated among insurgent groups.” From May through July 2005, attacks in Tall
‘Afar alone accounted for as many as 10 percent of all those in Iraq. Insurgent videos and
reports corroborated by residents recounted public executions for those who collaborated
with Americans. Had US forces allowed the insurgents to retain control of Tall ‘Afar, they
would have ceded the initiative to the enemy in northwest Nineveh and handed them an
important propaganda victory. 15
Responding to what had transpired in Tall ‘Afar, 2d Squadron shifted northward and
established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sykes at the Tall ‘Afar airfield, about 12
kilometers southwest of the city. With Support Squadron under Lt. Col. Richard O’Connor
sustaining the move and later establishing a detainee screening site south of the city, 2d
Squadron prepared the way for the regiment’s reception and integration into the new AO,
less 3d Squadron, in Operation COLD FUSION (1 May–15 June). While establishing itself
in its new AO, the squadron relieved Task Force (TF) 2-14 Cavalry, a Stryker squadron
from 1st BCT, 25th Infantry Division, of its responsibility for the province west of Mosul,
a brigade-size AO as large as Connecticut. By mid-May, Lt. Col. Gregory D. Reilly’s 1st
Squadron had established itself along the Syrian border, while 4th Squadron, under Lt.
Col. Douglass Pavek, had shifted to FOB Sykes to conduct operations in Tall ‘Afar and
western Nineveh. McMaster attempted to have 3d Squadron rejoin the command, but
because of mission requirements in Baghdad his attempts proved unsuccessful. 16

14 Col. H.R. McMaster, interview for Frontline, “The Insurgency,” Public Broadcasting System (fall 2005);
Charles Crain, “Iraq’s New Cops, Under Fire,” Time 165, no. 5 (31 January 2005), 37; Pratt, “Purging the
Insurgents”; Packer, “Letter from Iraq,” 5.
15 Ware, “Chasing the Ghosts.”
16 Ibid.; Brown, 3/3 ACR Operations and Intelligence Briefing; Molinari to Barclay.