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A few days earlier, on 23 May, a suicide car bomber had attacked members of the largely-
Shiite Jolaq tribe in retaliation for an earlier attack on two Sunni insurgent leaders, killing 15
and injuring 30. Rather than intimidating the Jolaq, the attack encouraged them to support the
counterinsurgency, which created an opportunity for Hickey’s troopers to begin earning their
trust and further developing their understanding of Tall ‘Afar. The improved relations yielded
more and better intelligence, which enabled the cavalry troopers to begin seizing more weapons
caches, preventing more attacks, and gradually building trust with the people. 27
Throughout June, the squadron executed several squadron-level operations within the
city, targeting insurgent safe havens in Hassan Qoi and Sarai. G Troop and Company H
supported by the OH58Ds of O Troop, 4th Squadron executed cordon and search missions
that seized dozens of weapons, ammunition, and other insurgent materials, while Howitzer
Battery became a motorized infantry company and manned traffic control points (TCPs) on
the city’s outskirts. Despite the squadron’s successes and the inroads it had made with some
of the populace, Sunnis in eastern Tall ‘Afar were reluctant to assist Hickey’s men. Their
reluctance hampered the squadron’s efforts to develop a comprehensive intelligence estimate
of the enemy and environment. Based on what information the 2d Squadron was able to
gather, the estimate indicated that Hassan Qoi and Sarai continued serving as safe havens for
the insurgents and that Qadisiyah was their battleground. 28
In a 4 June conference with nearly 80 sheiks at Al Kisik, an Iraqi army post about 25
kilometers east-northeast of Tall ‘Afar, many of the tribal leaders called for an assault along
the lines of the 2004 attack on Falluja to destroy the insurgents. Surprising the American
and Iraqi commanders, they complained that US forces were too gentle in their treatment
of the insurgents and that the Americans should be rougher on them. American and Iraqi
leaders demurred. “Rather than conduct[ing] destructive missions that focused on using an
inappropriate amount of firepower,” as the squadron’s account of its campaign in Tall ‘Afar
notes, the “Squadron developed the intelligence picture through various reconnaissance
operations while simultaneously planning for larger scale operations” that constricted and
isolated insurgent safe havens. 29
Patience and persistence finally paid off when G Troop gained the trust of an informant
with a thorough knowledge of the insurgents in Sarai. With the informant’s assistance, the
squadron began an operation on 7 June that focused on capturing or killing 30 high-value
targets (HVTs) in Sarai. The operation detained 23 HVTs “who seemed surprised by the size,
timing and direction of the attack from the desert, [and] were caught off guard.” Despite the
initial surprise, the enemy recovered and fought back, although by the end of the mission they
suffered 20 killed and an indeterminate number wounded. In the course of this operation, Lt.
Col. Terrence Crow of the 98th Advisory Support Team received a mortal wound when the
Iraqi soldiers he was leading were ambushed in an alleyway. While en route to the forward
aid station, Crow died. 30
27 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 12–13, 17.
28 Ibid., 14–15.
29 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 11; Oppel, “Magnet for Iraq Insurgents”; SFC Donald Sparks, “Conference
Focuses on Security for Tall Afar,” Mounted Rifleman, June 2005, 7.
30 Ibid., 15–17; Yingling interview; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Dozens Seized in Dawn Raid in Iraq’s North,” New

