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engaged with main gun fire insurgents who were harassing retiring units. the mission ended
later that morning with six detainees in hand. 40
Shortly after the Sarai raid, surveillance imagery identified insurgents planting IEDs
on the city’s east side. The squadron also received information from residents about an
insurgent IED class being held. Howitzer Battery, at FOB Sykes, opened up with its 155-mm
guns, which cancelled class. This sort of activity continued over the next 48 hours, and each
time Howitzer Battery responded. The squadron received reports that its fire killed over 30
and wounded another 20 insurgents.
Searches and raids continued throughout the shaping operation. In July, the squadron
learned of booby-trapped houses in Qadisiyah and accompanying insurgent activity that was
believed to be an attempt to divert the squadron’s attention from Sarai. Responding to this
information, Hickey launched a squadron-level raid against a dozen or so targets in Qadisiyah
on 30 July, capturing 24 insurgents. 41
Learning that the forest on the city’s southeastern edge was a source for cached insurgent
supplies, 2d Squadron launched an extensive reconnaissance of the woods and the nearby
neighborhoods on 7 August. The mission began with a 65-round artillery barrage at 0445,
as P Troop established overwatch and maintained aerial security. After uncovering several
caches and killing, capturing, or wounding a number of insurgents, the squadron notified the
city that the forest was off limits. It also declared the woods a “free fire” zone. 42
In an attempt to disrupt the flow of insurgent supplies, the squadron executed several
operations in locations outside of Tall ‘Afar, including transit and supply points within
Muhalibiya and Sheik Ibrahim. From 18 to 26 July, 1st Squadron reinforced 2d Squadron’s
efforts when it deployed half of its strength to Avgani, about 15 kilometers north of Tall ‘Afar.
Participation by 1st Squadron in this operation and the following operation (23 August–23
September) was significant to the outcome, but the “opportunity cost in this was halting
all border defense force training and interdictions along the Iraq/Syrian border, [actions]
which GEN [George] Casey . . . [had deemed] operationally significant.” After weighing the
decision to deploy 1st Squadron to Tall ‘Afar, McMaster decided it was worth the risk. On
the cusp of Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, US and Iraqi forces massed some 3,000 US
Soldiers and 5,500 Iraqi soldiers and police, bringing the troop-to-civilian ratio to something
between 1:23 and 1:17. 43
With much of the regiment’s strength concentrated in the Tall ‘Afar AO, American forces
began constructing a 12-kilometer berm around Tall ‘Afar to control traffic in and out of the
40 ibid.
41 ibid., 27.
42 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 24–31; Jonathan Finer, “U.S. Troops Cordon Part of Iraqi Town to Trap Insur-
gents: Rebels Have Fled Undetected in the Past,” Washington Post, 5 September 2005.
43 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 24–31; Reilly interview. The ratio is premised on a population of between
200,000 and 150,000. In the case of 8,800 Soldiers, the ratio works out to between 1:23 and 1:17. Some
estimates of troop strength have ranged from as low as 6,000 to as high as 11,000, bringing the Soldier-to-
civilian ratio to something between 1:33 and 1:13; Yingling interview; Hickey conversation; Frederick W.
Kagan, “A Plan for Victory in Iraq: Defeat the Insurgents Militarily—Here’s How,” The Weekly Standard,
vol. 11: 35 (29 May 2006), 5; Packer, 3; Kaplan, “Case for Staying in Iraq,” 23; Initial Impressions Report,
34–35; Molinari to Barclay.

