Page 230 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

732 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

city and to deny insurgents their freedom to maneuver. The suggestion to build the berm may
have come from Mayor Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri, who was then commanding Tall ‘Afar’s
police, and MG Khorsheed Saleem al-Dosekey, commander of the Iraqi 3d Division. Najim
and Khorsheed believed that the berm’s real value was the psychological impact it would
have on the insurgents, visually and mentally constricting their ability to maneuver. As with
other obstacles, the berm’s effectiveness would depend on the degree to which US and Iraqi
forces observed and covered it with direct and indirect fire. This obstacle was reminiscent
of recent barriers built by US forces in Iraq: in 2005 Army engineers built a 64-kilometer
berm around Mosul, in 2004 US forces encircled Fallujah with an earthen berm, and in 2003
an infantry battalion “wrapped” the village of Abu Hishma in concertina wire. From within
Tall ‘Afar, thousands of people vacated the city as US forces built the berm and publicly
announced the coming offensive; the magnitude of the exodus and ability and process in
determining whether those fleeing were insurgents or innocents may have been problematic.
Insurgents fled alongside the innocent, but in doing so removed themselves from play and
were thus unable to continue terrorizing the city. In order to ease the straits of Tall ‘Afar’s
evacuees, Support Squadron established a center for displaced Iraqis that provided food and
shelter for over 1,500 people. 44
As SABRE UNLEASHED approached its final stages, Sunni tribal leaders inclined
toward the insurgency in Tall ‘Afar pressed the government in Baghdad for relief from
American operations while their Shiite peers called for a military solution along the lines of
Operation PHANTOM FURY. By the close of August, 2d Squadron had executed over 1,500
reconnaissance patrols, 111 cordons and searches, and 46 raids. It had also destroyed over
900 enemy weapons, including artillery pieces and assorted munitions, captured over 200
insurgents or suspected insurgents, and killed over 130. 45
In preparation for Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, the Regiment of Mounted Rifles
massed “well over 3,000 [US] Soldiers” and 5,500 Iraqi soldiers and police, including
the Shiite “Wolf” Brigade, a police commando unit. The regiment’s “main effort” was 2d
Squadron as 1st Squadron and 3d Brigade, 3d Iraqi Division assumed responsibility for the
western half of the city. Hickey’s scheme of maneuver sent E Troop, Company H, and two
Iraqi battalions southward through Sarai, as F and G Troops, with Company A, 113th Combat
engineers, and three iraqi battalions advanced to the north. Save a predetermined route to
the south, the concentration of American and Iraqi forces in Sarai, the berm to the east,
and 1st Squadron and its Iraqi partner brigade to the west was supposed to have effectively
sealed the district. Throughout the course of the zone reconnaissance, insurgent isolation,
and deliberate attacks, US forces publicly announced their intentions, allowing innocents
and insurgents to flee or shift positions. Hickey aimed to drive the insurgents, along with

44 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 24; Hickey conversation. Some accounts claim the berm was as large as 80
kilometers. Finer, “U.S. Troops Cordon Part of Iraqi Town”; id., “As Offensive in Iraq Continues, Troops
Find Unexpected Quiet,” Washington Post (12 September 2005); Yingling interview; Michael Gilbert, “Sol-
diers of (Good) Fortune: Strykers Find Weapons Cache,” (Tacoma) News Tribune, 19 July 2005; Bing West,
“In Fallujah, Resistance Is Futile,” Slate, 23 May 2006, online at <http://www.slate.com/id/2142009/>, ac-
cessed September 2006; Dexter Filkins, “Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Town,” New York
Times, 7 December 2003; Molinari to Barclay.
45 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 30–31.