Page 232 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

734 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

them to the south, and ‘somehow—we don’t know how’—cutting through the screen line to
. . . the west,” and across the berm. 49
according to Time reporter Michael Ware, the delay left American Soldiers frustrated,
angry, and “embittered.” A Special Forces sergeant decried the pause as a “‘goat f___.’”
When the final assault began, “Not a hostile shot” was fired, nor were any insurgents found.
According to Ware, “Only one blackened corpse, left rotting for days, [was] found. ‘They’ve
even removed their dead,’ said a Green Beret, not really believing it himself.” This NCO
had but a limited view of the operation. Assigned to an Iraqi battalion from Irbil, about
150 kilometers to the east, he was unaware of the fuller details of Operation RESTORING
RIGHTS and the emphasis on creating a secure environment over simply killing insurgents.
Nonetheless, the regiment had killed over 150 and detained some 600, although a number of
the detainees were released for lack of evidence or because of false accusations. The ultimate
whereabouts or circumstances of escaped insurgents, whether later killed, captured, or co-
opted is unknown. 50
On 14 September, after having cleared Sarai, 2d Squadron temporarily handed it and
Hassan Qoi over to the control of Lt. Col. Christopher Gibson’s 2-325 Infantry. This freed
2d Squadron to secure the populace and lay the groundwork for Tall ‘Afar’s reconstruction
and recovery, and to prepare it for the constitutional referendum on 15 October 2005. Two
days later, on 16 September, 1st Squadron began its return to the Sinjar area along the Iraqi-
Syrian border. Hickey now faced a second major decision. In September 2004, following
the conclusion of Operation BLACK TYPHOON, Ham had decided to pull American forces
out of Tall ‘Afar. The withdrawal recognized the realities of the situation: there were not
enough American forces to maintain order and oversee Tall ‘Afar’s reconstruction while
other parts of Iraq begged for the deployment of American troops. Moreover, the need to
foster a positive image of American forces as allies rather than as occupiers demanded that
US forces turn over responsibility to Iraqi security forces. The level of American forces in
2005 was not appreciably different from that in 2004. Thus, Hickey’s dilemma was similar
to the one Ham faced in the aftermath of BLACK TYPHOON. On the one hand, retiring
from the city would have been an invitation for the return of the insurgents and an important
propaganda victory for their cause. On the other hand, should the squadron stay, it risked
giving the impression to the Iraqis that it was an occupying force. 51

* * *

Hickey elected to stay; it was a decision that had developed out of the squadron’s
experience in Tall ‘Afar and in the aftermath of BLACK TYPHOON. Rather than operating
from FOB Sykes, the squadron established or expanded its TCPs and troop-size patrol
bases throughout the city. From this point forward, 2d Squadron remained in Tall ‘Afar.

49 Ware, “Chasing the Ghosts”; Yingling interview.
50 Ware, “Chasing the Ghosts”; Oppel, “Under Pressure, Rebels Abandon an Iraqi Stronghold,” New York
Times, 12 September 2005; 4th CDO Bde AAR; Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 39.
51 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 38–39; John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency
Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 165.