Page 233 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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aCta
As Iraqi security forces grew and developed their proficiency, the scale and depth of the
security penetration increased. Because of the castle’s symbolic importance to the people,
Hickey shifted squadron headquarters to the old fortress and collocated with the city’s police
headquarters and the headquarters of the Iraqi 1st Brigade, 3d Division. The collocated
headquarters led to the establishment of a joint operations center (JOC) in the castle. With
civil, military, police, fire, and power representatives staffing it, the JOC served as a central
collection and action point for intelligence, operations, education, and training. The new
locations allowed the squadron to execute its missions more rapidly as it continued hunting
down insurgents. It also offered improved access for citizens willing to share information.
While the shift took place, many of the insurgents remaining within the city attempted their
escapes, often adopting the guises of women, ambulance drivers, and family members. Yet
others continued trying to place IEDs. 52
With US control established and insurgent operations disrupted, the squadron now directed
the delivery of food, water, and other necessities. Iraqi soldiers met returning citizens to
develop a rapport and good will with the people, but also to screen the people while looking
for insurgents. These soldiers also informed the people of the processes for initiating claims
for damages. Hickey and the Iraqi leadership initiated information operations (IO) to appeal
to the Sunni population to join the political and reconstruction processes and to enlist in the
local security forces. 53
throughout october, the remaining insurgents attempted to reestablish their bases in the
city to disrupt the constitutional referendum and demonstrate their resilience. US and Iraqi
forces seized a number of AK47s, sniper rifles, an IED, 60-mm mortar rounds, binoculars,
and four suspected insurgents on 4 October 2005 in Qadisiyah. In spite of the insurgents’
best attempts at reestablishing themselves in Tall ‘Afar, the tempo of operations had clearly
changed. Missions were still combat missions, but the size of the squadron’s elements was
scaled back from platoon to squad and even section level. The smaller patrols gave the Brave
Rifles a wider geographic presence and enabled them to work more closely with the Iraqi
units. As Iraqi proficiency and confidence grew, so too did their ability to begin working
autonomously. The changes allowed the squadron to increase its presence by establishing
platoon-size patrol bases throughout the city. 54
As units became more familiar with problem areas, they began positioning security
forces and altering patrol routes to address the grievances of the population. Troops began to
establish platoon-size patrol bases in and around Tall ‘Afar. Likewise, the Iraqi army began
to position itself within the AO to provide constant security to more citizens simultaneously.
As the US–Iraqi presence expanded, so too did the number of residents returning to their
neighborhoods. Potential recruits also began reporting to the police recruiting station in the
castle, with some 300 the first 2 days alone. The squadron estimated that 60 to 70 percent
were Sunni. In the end, the squadron aimed at establishing a force of 1,480. 55

52 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 39, 45.
53 ibid.
54 Ibid., 39.
55 Ibid., 41, 46; Hickey interview. The Iraqi payment periods were 30 October–1 November and 19–20 No-
vember 2005.