Page 238 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

740 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

pean ones, conduct population-focused peace support and combat operations nowadays in a
civilian-friendly manner because they want to, and because they must.
The real challenge for deployed field units from these countries, therefore, is to win
the allegiance of civilians through non-violent means, to target hearts and minds with real
progress and perception management instead of defeating enemies with firepower, while at
the same time using precision force when necessary. Its warriors, in addition to providing
basic security geographically (their ‘core business’) and enhancing the security apparatus
of host countries through security sector reform, find themselves being tasked outside their
traditional scope with repairing infrastructure, setting up capable government, creating good
basic living conditions, stimulating economic diversity and building good health and educa-
tion facilities, to name but a few of the ‘new’ non-military duty requirements.
For the Dutch armed forces, this focus of its expeditionary operations on the civil domain
really started with the Kosovo war in 1999, although the organisation has had a long tradition
of civilian-focused humanitarian assistance operations worldwide since the 1960s. During
the Cold War period, this humanitarian output was even larger than the contributions made to
classic UN peacekeeping operations, and grew even more rapidly in the 1990s after the Wall
came down. The Dutch population-centric approach therefore can be seen as being derived
from its peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance traditions more than from regular combat,
colonial combat or imperial policing experience, of which the Netherlands armed forces also
have plenty.

kosovo and baghLan
the Nato intervention in Kosovo in 1999, however, was the real big turning point to-
wards a new period of population-focused operations in general. Driven by the facts on
the ground, the Dutch military contingent, like the rest of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR),
exercised a total control over its area of responsibility in the war-torn province, not only by
securing it, but also by governing, maintaining public order, and providing support for hu-
manitarian aid, for reconstruction, and for the restoration of the rule of law and public admin-
istration. Without this event-driven, population-focused approach, it was thought, the support
of the people would be lost, which would ultimately result in the failure of the operation.
From the outset, policing and maintaining civil order was the most important task per-
formed by the Netherlands armed forces in Kosovo. Action was taken, for example, to stop
the carrying of weapons, and to stop ill-treatment and arson, by and against both Albanians
and Serbs. In addition, the peacekeepers dealt with many other forms of crime. The Dutch
KFOR unit also set up a ‘complaints office’ where Kosovar civilians could report all kinds
of offences and problems. It dealt with the absence of public administration, with judicial
conflicts, current criminal activities, and sensitive matters such as war crimes committed by
the Serbs during the 98-99 war. Furthermore, the Dutch troops, often in consultation with
civilian aid organisations, restarted public services like garbage collection, health care, fire
fighting, and water and power supply. 1
A couple of years later, in Afghanistan, the Dutch armed forces as part of the UN-

1 thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and civil power. Supporting or substituting civil authorities in modern
peace operations (Amsterdam 2006) 289-341.