Page 242 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

744 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

sion of TFU can be characterized as population-centric warfare. This means: the conflict is
centred on both the support and control of the population.” According to this concept, secu-
rity is only 25% of what the Task Force does. The other 75% of its effort is put into so-called
“non-kinetic operations” that concentrate on good governance, and social and economic de-
velopment projects. The Task Force has a broad strategic mission, not only to make Uruz-
6
gan safe, but also to make living conditions better. This was translated into a general intent:
TFU will rebuild if and when it can, and fight if it must.

concLusion
For the future – whether the Dutch armed forces will return to peacekeeping, or continue
to stand alongside the US in counter insurgency operations in the American global quest for
security, or redirect its focus maybe to other security issues – its expeditionary missions are
expected to remain population-centric in their approach. The examples of Kosovo, Bagh-
lan, Al Muthanna and Uruzgan show this is not considered to be a choice, but a necessity.
Soldiers therefore have to be lethal killers one moment, humanitarian aid workers the next.
They have to be flexible, and be able to switch very fast between population-centric and
enemy-centric actions. They have to have cultural awareness, and skills in governance and
economics. They will rarely fight the enemy directly anymore, but instead (and supposedly
more efficient) will constantly have to make opposing forces irrelevant by winning over their
civilian support base. Civilians therefore are likely to be a main strategic ‘soft’ target for a
long time to come.

6 W.S. Rietdijk, “Uruzgan: playing chess on four boards”, Militaire Spectator 177-9 (2008) 472-486 [article in
the Dutch language]. Quote from: Netherlands Institute of Military History, Task Force Uruzgan collection.