Page 244 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

746 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

weapons, operational methods, and techniques that offset the enemy’s advantages. The infe-
rior side will do everything in its power to manipulate and maneuver the confrontation in a
way that neutralizes the stronger side’s relative advantages and even turns them into relative
disadvantages. Thus the weaker side succeeds in converting his “supposed” inferiority into
an advantage and prevailing over the stronger enemy.
3
Despite the IDF’s (Israel Defense Forces) obvious advantages, the fighting in Lebanon
seemed to reveal more than a few failings, including those in field intelligence. These could
be found, first of all, in the misconstruction of the force, in the corrosion of systems whose
key importance on the battlefield should have been learned from pervious mistakes, from
modifications in the structure and hierarchy of units, and from certain basic needs relegated
to the sidelines because of new priorities. To sum up: the shortcomings were a case of urgent
matters sometimes taking precedence over vital ones.
The IDF’s fighting in previous wars (high intensity conflicts) was based on force ma-
neuvering. The role of the command centers – especially the divisional and corps echelons
(headquarters that the IDF later cancelled) focused on battle procedure, aimed at applying
the synergy of force and correct moves in the fighting zone. In recent years the focus has
gone through a major change when a new doctrine was adopted in which various types of
firepower became the main factor on the battlefield to ensure the enemy’s destruction.
Ehud Barak, the former prime minister and chief of staff, and current defense minister,
believes that Israel needs a small, smart, rapid army. He is convinced that firepower in gen-
eral and precision fire in particular provides an absolute advantage on the battlefield.
Field intelligence, like other intelligence agencies, has become increasingly focused on
target matters: target spotting, target acquisition and their destruction, by various fire deliv-
ery agents (aerial, naval, artillery, precision ground weapons, and so forth).
“Inter-branch” and “integrated” work, along with other forces (air and naval force for
example), and even organizations outside the army such as the Israeli police and Shin Bet
(Israel’s FBI), often shunted combat intelligence elements from its main purpose: providing
the fighting forces and unit headquarters with intelligence before and during the battle.

hezboLLah vs the idf
Before the war, Hezbollah fielded an impressively innovative military force incisively
tailored to meet a specific foe on particular terrain. While it could not match Israel’s overall
technology, professionalism or number of troops, that didn’t matter. Hezbollah fought with
alternative means for asymmetrical goals. On its own terms, it succeeded, adding a new
model terrorist army to the already-daunting range of 21st-century asymmetrical threats: the
army without a state .
4
The Hezbollah’s ground forces did not serve a state; they served a multifaceted organiza-
tion with a unifying vision. Hezbollah is the antithesis of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
which must be ready for different military activities anywhere in the Middle East; Hezbollah
faced a known enemy on predetermined terrain. In consequence, the well-funded terror or-

3 Shmuel Nir, “The Nature of Low Intensity Warfare,” in Hagai Golan and Shaul Shai (eds), Low Intensity
Warfare, (Ma’arachot, 2004) p. 19 [Hebrew].
4 Ralph Peters, Lessons from Lebanon, The new model terrorist army, Armed Forces Journal, october 2006.