Page 247 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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and West Bank, and the perpetual fear of penetration from the northern border, the focus of
interest again shifted. The conscript (regular) army’s combat intelligence-gathering units at
the divisional echelon were reassigned to aerial command intelligence-gathering battalions
where they engaged in information-gathering for low intensity warfare, daily information-
gathering in border areas, or more specifically, along the “security fence.” Male and female
conscripts in field intelligence quickly became experts in their main assignment along Is-
rael’s lengthy borders. In other words, this meant that observation of the enemy’s depth
altered. The lion’s share of the attention and technological equipment was diverted to the
“security-fence line.” Sometimes attention was aimed overhead (to prevent aerial incursions
in gliders or balloons), but following the abductions of IDF personnel the rear also received
attention so as to secure it and give warning if the enemy emerged from underground. Were it
possible, attention would have been diverted to the area under the soil for tunnel and bunker
detection.
It soon became apparent that a large amount of intelligence on Hezbollah (field forti-
fications, “nature reserves,” and bunkers – even when close to the border) had not been
properly collected and processed. Area observation elements were woefully unaware of the
accelerated pace of infrastructure development north of the border. The attempt to integrate
area units into intelligence-gathering units accompanying the maneuvering forces, operating
alongside or replacing the division’s organic target-acquisition/intelligence-gathering units,
did not work out as planned in the last war. Basic skills such as target-acquisition, target-
indication, and immediate and accurate artillery fire direction, did not meet the test in most
cases. Only in the last stages of the fighting, when reserve units were called up to beef up the
observations teams did observation reports begin arriving from the area’s depth.

terrain inteLLigence
Terrain intelligence, one of the mainstays in the doctrine of field intelligence, also re-
treated in recent years. Formerly, many soldiers acquired a professional background in geol-
ogy, geomorphology, navigation, fortification principles, and so forth in rigorous weeks- and
months-long courses. The principles and vast knowledge in terrain intelligence gave way to
remote sensory devices and technical operators who often failed to supply the maneuvering
echelon with the necessary information.
Locating axes and routes of movement in areas of limited navigability were subjects that
once occupied every combat intelligence officer. Locating the enemy’s expected blocking
points and finding ways to outflank and bypass them were an inseparable part of intelligence’s
responsibility in every operational plan. In the summer of 2006, the inexcusable number of
surprises on the maneuvering force’s route to its objective, and its difficulty in finding axes
for logistical transportation to the fighting forces, indicate insufficient preparation.
In recent years there has been a reduction in detailed area studies. This is true for the gen-
eral staff, as well as for corps and divisions. The routine tracking of modifications in enemy
weapons seems to have given way to the study of targets – buildings, warehouses, and facili-
ties used by various enemy organizations. The products of area study – photostats, sketches,
detailed area files, aerial photos, and even detailed topographical maps - were updated at far
too slow a pace and do not appear to have reached the planning and operational forces in