Page 249 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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Even intelligence data that the fighting forces procured at a great effort barely managed
to reach the top and complete the situation picture at headquarters. It was extremely diffi-
cult to locate Hezbollah layouts in underground bunkers, and cellars, and in facilities at the
entranceway to built-up areas created serious problems in locating the enemy’s layouts. The
Hezbollah fighter’s low signature proved devastatingly effective. Anti-tank teams operated
and IED (improvised explosive devices) were detonated from camouflaged positions ingenu-
ously concealed and almost impossible to destroy. The enemy’s near-perfect blending in
with the environment, his proximity to civilian dwellings, and superb camouflage, very often
prevented the fighting forces from identifying their targets.
The diversity of computer layouts often resulted in “communications short-circuits.”
Layouts that “didn’t talk to each other” meant that technical personnel had to sit in front of
an array of screens and “hand copy” the information from layout to layout. In many instances
the unwieldiness of this labor became so great that the soldiers reverted to writing with felt-
tip pens on sheets of polyethylene. “POLINT” resumed its place alongside VISINT, SIGINT,
and HUMINT.

concLusion
On paper, the IDF was clearly superior. In practice, its intelligence and mainly its combat
intelligence preparation of the battlefield made Hezbollah surprisingly effective.
This was the truly unexpected asymmetry. With a long-standing reputation for effective
work, Israel’s intelligence services failed this time (with echoes of 1973). Although capable
of identifying key fixed or substantial mobile targets — Israeli intelligence underestimated
the amount of weaponry available to Hezbollah; missed some late-generation weapons entire-
ly; didn’t supply enough information how deep, complex and well-constructed Hezbollah’s
front-line bunker system had become; and failed to predict Hezbollah’s tactical tenacity.
Despite decades of contact, the IDF combat intelligence was not able to provide all the
right information needed to the combat troops in the 2006 asymmetric war in South Leba-
non.