Page 246 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

748 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

identification-to-kill time of less than five minutes — but the technique only worked against
larger-caliber weapons delivered by formal launchers. The man-pack Katyushas that rained
down on Israel day after day proved too elusive for technical collection means. Delivered in
sufficient numbers, they did the job. Israel’s total casualties remained low (117 soldiers killed
and 41 civilians dead), but a new sense of vulnerability stunned the population.

idf combat inteLLigence in the war
The main role of combat intelligence, which operates in formations from the aerial com-
mand level down to the last soldier in the ranks, is to provide the necessary intelligence to
the forces at the combat assistance and support, and maneuvering echelons. Intelligence of-
ficers in the field echelons operate in headquarters at the divisional, brigade, and battalion
echelons. They serve as an anchor in staff operations in all questions of battle procedure prior
to the engagement and in all operational matters during the fighting. They supply the neces-
sary information for situation estimates to help the unit commanders and their staffs design
and execute operational plans.
In addition to their senior association in staff operations, combat intelligence officers
had to provide unit commanders and troops with intelligence data, and confirm that it was
satisfactorily absorbed so that it influenced the force’s battle preparations and guaranteed the
maximum employment of its capabilities when the force engaged the enemy.
Combat intelligence’s areas of responsibility (excluding intelligence-gathering, process-
ing, and circulating) were - and remain – collecting information on the terrain, on the enemy
himself, and other relevant parameters. In the past combat intelligence had to analyze the
data, provide the fighting forces with estimates of threats, and spell out the bottom line: the
enemy’s most likely modi operandi.

the main eLements in inteLLigence-gathering: observation and
reconnaissance
Throughout history field intelligence’s main methods of intelligence-gathering were
observation and reconnaissance performed by specially-tasked units using the appropriate
equipment. Intelligence collected on the line of contact and in the depth of the front consisted
of information on enemy territory: topography, navigability, fortifications, obstacles and tar-
gets. The data also dealt with the enemy’s weapons, equipment, order of battle (ORBAT),
and deployment.
Over the years, IDF reconnaissance units in the brigades and battalions level, shifted from
intelligence tasks to combat missions, operating as an elite fighting force. During operations
against Hezbollah in South Lebanon improvisations had to be made and equipment found
for units that had not been deployed, and using them in place of the recon forces engaged
in actual combat. Although they did their utmost, these units were not an organic part of the
fighting force, and were not the same as an organic force trained and integrated in intelli-
gence-gathering at the unit level.
Observation elements and intelligence-gathering units at the division level had their pri-
mary assignment task transferred from combat intelligence-gathering for the maneuvering
forces to intelligence-gathering for target acquisition. Given the “Intifada” in the Gaza Strip