Page 248 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

750 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

time. Rapid development in areas of security interest and the trend toward accelerated urban-
ization should have been continuously updated and internalized. It appears that Israel’s intel-
ligence organizations bodies did not fulfill their demanding - sometimes Sisyphean – tasks.
The chronic lack of intelligence elements or even general staff replacements in the reserve
divisions made it difficult to carry out the vital task of updating.

on enemy inteLLigence

One of the responsibilities of the ground forces’ intelligence is to guarantee that the ene-
my’s weapons and equipment do not come as a surprise on the battlefield. Field intelligence’s
job is not limited to merely processing information, but to making it available to all the troops
(down to the last soldier). Awareness of the enemy requires internalizing knowledge of him
(mess hall posters are a poor substitute for detailed reports, briefings, study days, and lesson
plans). At the same time problem-solving methods must be devised. Mechanisms such as
“red lights” need to demonstrate new threats coming not only from the latest weaponry in en-
emy hands, but also from his way of using them and the advantages it gives him. Field intelli-
gence officers at all echelons must ensure that in addition to indicating the threat, a process of
“blue lights” takes place whereby solutions are provided for unfamiliar operational situations
on the battlefield. The “surprise” that Hezbollah’s anti-tank missiles caused, notwithstanding
that only some of them were relatively modern, could have been prevented had intelligence
officers made their superior officers aware of the missiles’ technological capabilities as well
as the battlefield situations they were capable of creating.
The blue-ribbon Agranat Committee that was authorized after the Yom Kippur War stated
that in light of the “Sager surprise,” the intelligence organizations had to carry out a com-
prehensive study of the enemy’s weapons and equipment, as well as his warfare doctrine,
since this was likely to change after he absorbed new weapons. Indeed, following the 1973
War two new branches were formed in the general staff. Their task was to study the enemy’s
warfare doctrine, present expected threats resulting from it; circulate the information to the
rest of the fighting force, and parallel to this, verify that a process was in effect that provided
answers to the new threats. Of these two branches nothing remains.

circuLating inteLLigence
In the past, the transfer of intelligence to headquarters, and from headquarters to the
fighting forces, was done through written memos and radio transmissions. The quantum-leap
in technological development in recent years had a profound impact in this area too. Com-
puter layouts became the main tool for command and control and for relaying information
in general, and intelligence information in particular. Computerized layouts allowed updated
situation pictures to be received in headquarters ensconced in comfortable command posts
located in the rear of the battle zone. Divisional and even brigade headquarters became static.
“Plasma screens” replaced human, hands-on contact, and frontline leadership. They often
“prevented” the commanding officer (in tandem with the intelligence officer) from being in
position where they could give the order: “Follow me, men.” Intelligence officers found it in-
creasingly difficult to integrate information received at headquarters into operational moves
for the units deployed on the line of contact.