Page 227 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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and against the American occupation, but also Americans’ difficulty in comprehending “an
asymmetric war going on within an asymmetric war.” As one Iraqi official put it with more
than a measure of truth, “‘Americans always want one simple enemy. You need to think and
act as if you had 250. Some are outsiders, some insiders. Some are fanatics, and some who
might be persuaded to join the political process. We have tribes, cells, mosques, towns, and
parts of cities with different goals, and different tactics.’” 34
The 2d Squadron confronted a major dilemma: how best to quash the insurgency while
gaining the trust of the people, or, at the very least, not antagonizing them. To unaccustomed
American eyes, the insurgents were indistinguishable from the larger population. Their
ability to hide in plain sight allowed them to circulate and act with impunity. Without the
ability to identify their enemies, American strength and intentions were for naught. So
long as the insurgents intimidated the people, the insurgents were safe. Operation BLACK
TYPHOON had demonstrated to the people of Tall ‘Afar the power of the US Army, but the
rapid withdrawal prevented the creation of a safe environment. American forces had killed
or driven out insurgents but had then left the people to their own devices, which allowed
insurgents to return. How best to render order out of chaos? The squadron could mass its
firepower, but where and against whom and to what effect?

* * *

Create a safer and more secure environment, Hickey reasoned, and the population would
become more amenable to the American presence and more trusting of nascent Iraqi institutions
of governance, including the army and police. Working closely with McMaster and regimental
planners, Hickey and his staff determined that changing Tall ‘Afar’s environment would be
more productive and result in a longer-lasting effect than focusing on destroying or defeating
the insurgents, an impossible task given the squadron’s inability to differentiate friends from
enemies without local assistance. To accomplish this, the squadron launched a series of
shaping and reconnaissance operations that developed its situational awareness, expanded its
presence throughout the ao, and made tentative inroads with the population. 35
Throughout its deployment to Tall ‘Afar, the squadron worked at integrating Iraqi forces
to improve their operational capabilities and awareness. For most of this period, soldiers
of the Iraqi Army’s 1st Brigade, 3d Division could only function at squad and lower levels.
To raise the Iraqis’ proficiency, the squadron increasingly integrated them into operations,
with troop commanders partnering with battalion commanders. In spite of their low levels
of training, the Iraqis were a valuable source of dismounted infantry for securing routes and
protecting fixed structures and sites, as well as for their language skills and understanding of
the culture. As 2d Squadron prepared for future operations, it requested additional forces;
it received Company D, 1/3 ACR and 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 3d Iraqi Division. Elements
from Special Forces also arrived to intensify and improve the Iraqis’ training and military
capacity. 36

34 Cordesman, “War for a Civil War,” 3, 1; Finer, “Few Foreigners Are Found.”
35 Hickey conversation.
36 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 22.