Page 224 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

726 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

on 9 May. Because the crew maintained security and fired on the attacker, it prevented
the bomber from getting too close. The crew’s alertness coupled with the Bradley’s armor
limited the damage and protected the troopers. It was another 4 months before the insurgents
attacked 2d Squadron with a car bomb. In spite of this respite, the insurgents continued
their attacks hoping to disrupt American operations and further terrorize and dishearten the
iraqis. 24
Toward the end of May, the squadron began developing a clearer picture of the situation in
Tall ‘Afar and the several friction points contributing to the popular alienation that sustained
the insurgency. First, the Mounted Riflemen realized the insurgency could not have existed
without the tacit support of any number of the 83 sheiks and their tribes, some of which,
like the Shiite Sadr and Sunni Farhat, were feuding with one another in the Wahda district.
Second, the majority-Shiite police force, when it was not holed up in the castle, was little
better than a death squad, spreading its own brand of terror and revenge. The Ministry of
the Interior had helped solve this problem in early May when it replaced the corrupt chief,
Ferris Ismael, with Brig. Gen. Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri, who later became mayor of Tall
‘Afar. Hickey also suspected the complicity of the mayor, who was able to travel throughout
the city with only a small escort while well-armed patrols were regularly attacked. Third,
the ill will engendered by Operation BLACK TYPHOON, the uneven progress of rebuilding
following that operation, and the 75-percent unemployment rate further contributed to
popular discontent. Finally, the largely uneducated or illiterate population was especially
susceptible to insurgent suasion. The insurgent centers of gravity in the Sarai and Qadisiyah
districts included the city’s hospital, itself a frequent target of attacks and attempted seizures
by extralegal security forces. Attacks against what ought to have been a place of healing
intensified as Iraqi forces, supported by the squadron, sought to secure it. 25
On 20 May, 2d Squadron established a cordon around the Qadisiyah district as it executed
Operation COLD STEEL, which aimed at killing or capturing insurgents operating in
Qadisiyah and demonstrating to them the strength of 2d Squadron’s combat power. Operating
in conjunction with its iraqi partner brigade, the squadron captured five suspected insurgents
and some weapons. limited in time, scope, and area when compared to the larger ongoing
mission of COLD FUSION, COLD STEEL was the first time Hickey’s squadron and its Iraqi
partner brigade operated together in a large-scale mission. Hickey anticipated an insurgent
reaction; he did not wait long. On the evening of 26 May, over a dozen insurgents, supported
by mortars, machine guns, and RPGs, attempted overrunning an Iraqi patrol base in Hassan
Qoi. Supported by tanks and a sniper team from H Company, the Iraqis defeated the attempt.
In search of easier targets, the insurgents shifted their focus to civilians, hoping to cow them
into submission. They miscalculated. 26

24 ibid.
25 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 9–13; Hickey interview; Squadron Commanding Officer’s Counterinsurgency
Operation Briefing, “2nd Squadron, 3d ACR: Fighting the Insurgency in Tall Afar,” version 1, 2006; Finer,
“Troops Sweep into City of Tall Afar”; Lawrence F. Kaplan, “The Case for Staying in Iraq: Centripetal
Force,” The New Republic, 6 March 2006, 22; Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, personal e-mail message, 23 June
2006.
26 Simmering, 2/3 ACR Actions, 12; Christopher M. Hickey, “Sabre Squadron,” Mounted Rifleman, May 2005,
12.