Page 256 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II
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758                                XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

              By observing the graphic above we can see, even though this was a high percentage, the
           mortality was very low: a rate of 1,74% .
                                            7
              This can be explained essentially by two motives:
              1.  A lot of the health problems presented were associated to malnutrition and weak-
                 ness , only needing some rest and nourishment to recover;
                    8
               nd
              2 . seriously ill patients were transferred to other hospitals, including military hospitals.
              It’s probable that the great peak of soldiers hospitalized during the month of June of 1808
           was also due to the insurrection against French occupation. The only diagnostic that we
           found belonged to a soldier from the local militia who gave entry during the dawn of August
           7th with a bullet wound in the abdomen, and that latter finished by dying.
              In the month of July of the same year, we also detected the hospitalization of the hospitals
           nurse . Could this be an indication of an infectious disease?
                9
              As we said before, the soldiers played an important role in the diffusion of certain ill-
           nesses as typhus, scabies, tuberculosis, syphilis, etc. Another important aspect for this case of
           study is the climate: Vila Real has strong climatic changes – very hot summers and very cold
           winters – that could help in the appearance and diffusion of certain illnesses, like malaria, an
           endemic illness in this region in the past.
              At the beginning of 1809, the number of hospitalized soldiers decreased and the number
           of civilians remained very low. Shortly after this, in April, the hospital closed. This was coin-
           cident with the entrance of French troops in Vila Real in May and the subsequent evacuation
           of the villa . What we don’t understand is why the hospital took so long to reopen.
                    10
              One of the causes was probably the financial difficulties caused by the war and the great
           number of soldiers that were treated . A lot of money had to be spent with the laundry, food,
                                         11
           remedies and staff. Some authors state that the treatment of soldiers could be an important
           financial income for the hospitals . The only problem was that Portugal was facing strong
                                        12
           economical problems and the payments came too late .
                                                        13
              The hospital closed its doors for the second time from September to December of 1810.
           This was coincident with the third French invasion and the appearance of epidemics in Por-
           tugal, like typhus and typhoid. In fact a great number of deaths occurred in Portugal during
           October of 1810 and March of 1811 .
                                         14
              In the summer of 1811 a great number of soldiers entered in the hospital and once more
           we verify a decrease in the treatment of civilians (That last until January of 1812) and the
           close of the hospital. This could only mean that the Misericórdia was once more enduring
           financial difficulties.

           7   We have counted eight soldier’s deaths: one in 1808, 1810 and 1812; five in 1811.
           8   Araújo, 2005: 652.
           9   Advr, lv. 135, fol. 181.
                                                                   th
           10   According to Carlos Azeredo, the French troops entered in Vila Real on the 3  of May, and camp near to Vila
               Real until the 7  of May; Azeredo,1984: 188-189; 194.
                         th
           11   ADVR, lv. 002, fol. 12v-13.
           12   Sá, 1997: 28-29, 234-235.
           13   On this subject, read Araújo, 1998: 42; Araújo, 2002: 4-9.
           14   Cascão, 1998: 374.
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