Page 253 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version
P. 253

FROM THE STRAITS TO THE VOLTURNO               251



                  However, no one can today reasonably deny that the great author of our
               national unification had to the highest degree those particular qualities that,
               as a whole, constitute a military genius.
                  It suffices to analyse, in some detail without digressing beyond the limit-
               ed scope of our discussion, the actions that he prepared and led and, the
               crossing of the Straits of Messina, the very famous conquest of Calabria and
               the march that, as quick as lightning and in triumphant majesty, brought him
               to Naples. Through the unavoidable mistakes and uncertainties, very often
               due to his subalterns, it is easy to discern the artistic cleverness of someone
               who knows war and knows how to make it. Critical situations, serious prob-
               lems that would have worried the mind of expert Staff officers, were faced
               and solved with firm resoluteness; logistic difficulties, as we use to say today,
               were skilfully overcome, despite the serious lack of and the many failures of
               the tool that the general could use.
                  Let us analyse them.
                  After the conquest of Sicily, Garibaldi intended to cross to the continent,
               but, on the other side of the straits, the cannons of the forts kept a sharp watch
               and the Bourbon troops kept on the alert and moved continuously. At sea, the
               fleet cruised, although not always vigilant, and perhaps in part disloyal.
                  Where should he establish his operations base? From this he selects Punta
               del Faro, that on the one hand allowed him to gather, and almost to isolate
               his small army that he wanted to organise and prepare for future tasks and
               on the other hand was a real bridgehead to the Calabrian coast and it was
               observed, seen and watched from everywhere. Since it was convenient for
               Garibaldi that the Bourbon troops distracted their attention from the point
               or points where he had already decided to land, he, by all means, saw that
               his enemies could be deceived and brought to believe that another landing
               similar to that of Marsala was being prepared near Naples. God made King
               Francis loose his wits, and at his court little was done for the Calabrian Coast
               threatened from close up and on the contrary worries focused on the capital,
                  Where to land? Where to direct the vanguard that shall constitute their
               “bridgehead” on the other side of the straits? Near the fortified Reggio or near
               Scilla? Attempts of landing were made here and there, by small units. If they
               reached the landing place, so much the better, they would be immediately fol-
               lowed by the main body, but he, in the secrecy of his heart, had already decid-
               ed to rush to Melito, east of Capo dell’Armi, where the enemy would be less
               vigilant and more likely could be the surprise and success. Arrived finally on
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