Page 255 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

FROM THE STRAITS TO THE VOLTURNO 253

well beyond the orders of his leader and, if the plan of garrisoning some
forces in Caiazzo, to control both banks, was a praiseworthy intention and
the conquest of that city seemed easy to achieve, it was certainly difficult to
keep it. There was, in short, an incorrect assessment of what was necessary,
and this perhaps was due to excessive confidence and the usual optimism of
someone who, at that time, as a result of so many victories, did not overly
consider the difficulties when he aimed at achieving his purpose. Anyway,
either due to rashness or mistake, Garibaldi said that the holocaust of those
valiant soldiers had been a deplorable sacrifice, since they had been driven
back from Caiazzo and had found their death in the streets of that town and
the waters of the Volturno.
A certain forecast of the future, a wise analysis of the situation and the
painful experience of what had happened during his absence forced Garibaldi
to limit his plans and adapt them to his modest possibilities, even when all
his forces were concentrated on the left bank of the Volturno, and therefore
he did not think of seeking a victory on the right bank of the river, nor did
he think of conquering the fortress of Capua.
On the other hand, it looked very likely that the Bourbon troops wanted
to start a vast operation to get their revenge in some way for the defeats suf-
fered and to open the way to the capital for Francis II.
Now, with the available forces and their real efficiency, Garibaldi could
consider quite an achievement to cause the failure of such an intention, to
repel all attempts to cross to the left bank. That’s why on September 22 nd ,
in S. Angelo, the general gave the famous directives for a strict defence. He
sensed since then, and made others notice fully, the importance of
Maddaloni, “and its key position”.
The volunteers’ deployment was faultless from a military viewpoint: a line
of strongholds duly reinforced by field works; three lines with the main body
covered by outposts, front-line corps, observation corps - a powerful and
well distributed security system that excluded the possibility of surprises and
that could oppose the enemy’s sallies with a resistance made of consecutive
waves of soldiers, ever greater in number.
st
Certainly the fight of October 1 drove back the Bourbon army to the
positions from where it had come, and in so doing prevented that the great
undertaking almost miraculously achieved at the price of invaluable sacrifices
would be made pointless and that the glorious plan skilfully prepared by
Cavour in the silence of his office in Turin, despite the hostility and diffi-