Page 256 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

254 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

dence of almost all the European powers, would be destroyed with one blow.
From a military point of view, Garibaldi’s merit is not diminished by the
consideration that Ritucci’s operative concept as we explained above could
only lead the Bourbon army to failure: the frontal attack, destined to favour
their circumstances, required surprise and different number of men forces
tasked variously with the main action and the demonstrative action.
Garibaldi, who also on this occasion revealed a sharp knowledge of the
ground and of war, wrote that the consequences of the enemy’s offensive
would have been by far different if the adversaries had opposed weak forces
in front of Capua and concentrated most of their forces in Maddaloni.
The need to face the enemy in all the different directions that could prove
dangerous forced Garibaldi to position his stretched forces along a very vast
front and some “expert after the event” reproached him on it.
But, apart from the fact that the course of the battle showed that he had
been fully right, since all his elements were attacked and the attack was more
relentless at the two ends of both flanks, it must be conceded that he could
not foresee that his enemy would concentrate the main part of his forces in
S. Angelo and S. Maria.
It is similarly clear that if the general had gathered the greatest part of his
men in the sector that he deemed more delicate – that is, Maddaloni – and
had thought that his enemy would follow the most logical plan, he would
have had problems in front of Capua, where the fight took a more violent
course and where, in fact, the fate of that day was decided.
He had, however, some reserves duly deployed in a central position and
therefore able to rush towards a threatened or unsafe point, and there were
precisely the troops of Türr that blocked the enemy upon receiving prompt
orders by Garibaldi and assured the further defence of S. Maria, and from
there, in the climax of the action, the counter-attack was launched and after
a long fight succeeded in finishing off the Bourbon’s obstinacy and drove
back the royal troops towards the walls of Capua.
Both adversaries fought with great bravery. The Bourbons had some numer-
ical superiority and that would have been even more overwhelming if they had
launched all the units available to the other bank of the Volturno. Moreover,
their cohesion, armaments and training were unquestionably better.
But their leaders were not able to prepare any plan and any detailed
action, and also failed to implement what they devised. In fact, the columns
of Perrone, Ruiz, and Von Mechel operated without keeping any connection