Page 26 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
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THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)




              and sometimes even the time required to decrypt some dispatches completely or partially, also
              providing useful information to identify codes and ciphers that withstood their attacks.


              Poorly docuMenTed crITIcIsMs
              Ronge’s statements concerning the Italian Intelligence Service and, particularly Italian cryptology,
              spread internationally, also due to the volume’s translation into French and to a remarkable work
              by Yves Gylden, a Swedish cryptology expert who summarised in a book the contents of the
              essays and memoirs which appeared until 1930 about interception and cryptology activities on the
              Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts during WWI .
                                                           29
              For Gylden, there was certainly no shortage of information sources because of the several papers
              published  in  the  20s, as pointed  out  above,  by cryptanalysts  operating  during  the  war on all
              the fronts with exception of the Italian - Austrian one. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his
              information about the Italian-Austrian front was exclusively originated from the books by Ronge,
              adding: “Having access to reliable Italian documentation and using it to make comparisons would
              have been really interesting, but unfortunately, as far as this author could ascertain, to date, there
              are no published documents on these activities” .
                                                          30
              Nevertheless,  the  Swedish cryptographer  accepts  as correct  the  negative  statements  made  by
              Ronge about the deficiencies of the Italian military cryptographic service without making any
              critical analysis. This often leads him to regard the Italian cryptographic service’s performance as
              a bad example.
              In order to provide general indications and suggestions about cryptologic methods and techniques,
              Gylden goes beyond the information given by Ronge’s book since he sometimes draws inferences
              and formulates hypotheses not supported by the information contained in that book.
              One of his mistakes, possibly based on a misinterpretation of some Ronge’s statements, concerns
              the assumed Austrian failure to decrypt Italian radio dispatches since the beginning of 1918,
              shortly after the arrival of the British and French troops in Italy, in November 1917 . On these
                                                                                            31
              grounds, Gylden argued that the Italian cryptology changed more considerably during the last
              year of the war in comparison to what happened on other fronts because “the highly experienced
              French and English experts effected a radical reorganisation of the Italian cryptographic service”
              and therefore “the Austrians had to confront adversaries who were cleverer than the Italians” .
                                                                                                   32
              However, Ronge himself openly states that the Austrian decrypting of Italian radio dispatches
              decreased in 1918 but did not cease entirely ,and in the 1947 edition of his ‘Manual’, Luigi Sacco
                                                      33
              strongly criticised the statements made by the Swedish author, claiming that the progress achieved
              during the last part of the war originated only from within the Italian Cryptographic Unit itself .
                                                                                                     34
              Among the controversial aspects of Gylden’s work, we cannot but remember the sharp contrast
              between his admiration for the “splendid Austrian cryptographic and cryptanalytic services” and


              29  Y. Gylden, Chifferbyrliâernas Insatser I Varldskriget Till Lands (Contribution of the Cryptographic Bureaus in WWI),
              Stockolm, 1931. The Gylden book became internationally known after its publication in abridged form on the Revue Militaire
              Française in August 1931 and its complete translation into English, which appeared in instalments on the Signal Corps
              Bulletins from the end of 1933 up to and including 1934. The integral English version is titled The Contribution of the
              Cryptographic Bureaus in the World War and was published in instalments in the Signal Corps Bulletins Nos. 75 - 81,
              November 1933 - November 1934, with notes by Major W. F. Friedman, who was one of the major American cryptologists.
              30  Y. Gylden, op. cit., Publications of Riverbank Laboratories, p. 77.
              31  ibid., p.81.
              32  ibid., p.77, 82.
              33  M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p. 354, 355, which mentions some cryptanalysis operations carried out in October 1918.
              34  L. Sacco, Manuale di Crittografia, op. cit., p.309.


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