Page 27 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER ONE

the extremely negative assessments about the Austria-German cryptologic school expressed in
other parts of the book. In his opinion, that school showed lack of in-depth scientific knowledge
and proposed complex encoding methods that “facilitated the solution of ciphers instead of making
it difficult” . In the preface to his Cryptographic Memories of 1947, Figl strongly questioned
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Gylden’s criticisms.
Despite these remarks and some other comments contained in the notes written by Gylden’s
commentator, the renowned American cryptologist William F. Friedman, the book undoubtedly
has merits that justify its international success since it aims at summarising in an organised way
several useful lessons that previously could be found scattered in other publications.
It is noteworthy too that Gylden does not absolve any of the belligerents. About the Russians
who, at the beginning of the war, sent plain radio dispatches acting with great negligence, he
writes: “Russia was not the only warring nation guilty of such carelessness. The armies of all the
belligerents were guilty, some to a greater extent, such as those of Italy and Germany, and others
to a lesser extent, such as those of France, England and Austria” .
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1.3 UP TO THE PRESENT

ronge’ MeMoIrs
In 1943, when World War II raged on all fronts involving the remaining forces of Austria which had
become an integral part of the Third Reich, retired General Maximilian Ronge, who was almost
70, devoted himself to revising the history of WWI cryptology, telephone, and radio interception
and to writing new reports, also to support the description of events contained in his book.
General Ronge’s memoirs, preserved in the Kriegsarchiv of Vienna, include a report about the
radio interception and cryptanalysis service against Italy, together with the translation into German
of a few passages on the same subject from the book by Osvaldo Marchetti . Another report
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concerns the telephone eavesdropping on the Italian front .
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The first report, which includes 78 annexes, also deals with the events which occurred on the
Balkan front, focusing on the activities performed on that battlefield by the Italian troops. In
particular, the author goes into a detailed description of the cryptanalysis activities performed in
1918, as if to provide adequate documentation that could disprove Gylden’s thesis which by then
Ronge probably knew well.
In addition to what he had already reported in his book, Ronge includes several other documentation
and details while maintaining a tone of superiority, sometimes even of mockery, in relation to the
Italian Intelligence Service and especially to the Italian cryptographic capacities. He concludes his
writing with the well-known statement contained in the report of the Commission of enquiry on
the Battle of Caporetto, to demonstrate the Austrian supremacy recognised by the enemy.

35 Y. Gilden, op. cit., p. 6 ff. Basically, the author accused the German cryptologic school of relying exclusively on empirical
and intuitive methods, which inevitably led to complex and ineffective ciphers and cryptanalyses, instead of following the
example of the French, who used mathematical and scientific tools, such as statistical tables of code groups.
36 Y. Gylden, op. cit., p.1.
37 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch und Dechiffrier - Dienst Gegen Italien und am Balkan, 15/III/1943; Das Italienische
Ciffrenwessen, Wien Kriegsarchiv, Ronge Nachlaß, B126:3/II, p. 1 - 52a. The Ronge reports and several annexes are signed
by the author and dated 1943.
38 M. Ronge, Die Telefon Abhorchdienst, 1/III/1943, Vienna, Kriegsarchiv, Nachlaß, B126:3/IV, p. 1 – 54.

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