Page 343 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CONCLUSIONS

distinctive trait of the Italian top military organisation since the 19 century - which had not with-
th
stood the test of WWI, proving to be anachronistic and inefficient.
The Service relocated near the Supreme Command in the area around Padua, focused its activity no
longer on political issues but rather on the best systems to break down the enemy combat potential,
exploiting the achieved greater autonomy also for planning unconventional warfare. At the same
time, the cooperation between the different central and detached elements of the Intelligence
organisation became closer, with a more effective filtering and timely exploitation of information .
5
The communication security too experienced relevant improvements since the Cryptographic Unit
was ultimately assigned the full responsibility of producing and checking all the Army’s ciphers
and codes. The number of the main Italian cryptographic systems unknown to or unbroken by the
enemy increased during the year, reaching a figure of at least ten at the end of the war.
Undoubtedly, the timely replacement of all major codes and ciphers, implemented during the
planning for the last Italian offensive that led to the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, was the most
outstanding measure adopted by the Cryptographic Unit. The new systems introduced in October
1918 were not at risk of being broken, also because the enemy lacked the time necessary to collect
the material required for their analysis, keeping the skillfull Austro-Hungarian cryptanalysts in
check during the decisive final phase of the war.
The above brief overview depicted the evolution of the cryptologic war won by the Austro-
Hungarians in the early stages of the conflict, in terms of number of breached ciphers and
decrypted dispatches, also by employing partially mechanised systems. Later, the quantitatively
limited and yet highly efficient team led by Sacco regained terrain. It fought more effectively after
November 1917 when, following a more frequent use of radio communications by the Austrians,
the cryptanalysis work could be managed on nearly equal footing on both sides of the front, with a
growing Italian incidence that peaked in October 1918 thanks to new, unbroken codes and ciphers.
Based on the research done to write this book, we can, therefore, confirm the statements of Marchetti
and Sacco about the gradual results the Cryptographic Unit obtained through firm commitment
and spirit of sacrifice. Contrary to the Gylden assumptions in 1930, carelessly taken up by some
later scholars, those results had been achieved starting from the summer of 1916 and, to a greater
extent, from the last months of 1917, without any help from the French or British Allies.
It is astonishing that Sacco and his team - initially 9 units, who became a few dozen at the end
of the conflict - were able to reach a capability comparable with those of much larger enemy and
allied organisations having consolidated traditions and experience.

Despite the undoubted interest aroused by the secret war conducted around cryptology and, more gener-
ally, about Communication Intelligence, one cannot but recognise the general prevalence, during WWI,
of human intelligence sources over COMINT, especially in terms of the influence these information
sources had on the events of the war. The interrogations of prisoners and deserters perfected using hidden
microphones , the capture of enemy documents and the information provided by various types of agents
6
have played a crucial role, not only on the Italian-Austrian front.
The results of telephone interception, although largely increasing during the conflict, was indeed
significant but not comparable to those achieved by traditional sources. On the other hand, radio
intelligence - which owes its fame to profound technical and scientific interest, to the emphasis

5 Despite difficulties and misunderstandings, the relationship between the Chief of the Intelligence Office/Service of the
Supreme Command and the officials in charge of Intelligence operations inside the Army Headquarters were generally
cooperative and intense, since 1915.
6 The Italians and Austrians used these microphones to intercept conversations between prisoners occurred spontaneously or
induced by undercover agents.

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