Page 339 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the dramatic experience of the Third War of Independence - lost by Italy mainly for lack
of information and scarce clarity along the Army chain of command - a General Staff including an
intelligence unit modelled after the German army’s was not established until 1882 . However, the
1
intelligence branch, in its early stages of development, remained concealed during non-belligerent
times, whereas during the mobilisation for war, it boosted up to become an actual Intelligence
Office.
Even though a stable intelligence body in the Italian army initiated its activity in 1897, its information
gathering operations were hampered until 1914, not so much by organisational shortcomings as by
the lack of funding, which for instance hindered the recruitment and management of an adequate
number of agents working abroad. In recognising the importance of an efficient information cell
within the Headquarters of the General Staff Corps, General Alberto Pollio worked to improve its
efficiency irrespective of chronic financial restraints. Nevertheless, it took some time before the
Italian Intelligence branch could try to match the primacy of the Austro-Hungarian Evidenzbureau,
which had superior traditions and consolidated prestige inside the Dual Monarchy.
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the Evidenzbureau had also incepted an innovative
activity aimed at intercepting and interpreting the emerging Italian radio communications,
especially military ones already considered as a potential source of information. The interception
activities intensified when the relations between the two countries became critical, that is, after
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-1909) and even more during the Libyan war (1911-
1912).
The Italian army, trying to provide more secure telegraphic communications, had previously
adopted some codes that, for some years, made the interpretation of dispatches more difficult.
To overcome this obstacle, beginning in 1911, the Evidenzbureau started to train specialists in
cryptology and purchased the most important Italian codes on the black markets that flourished in
Europe at that time. The Italian Armed Forces, also due to the insufficient cryptologic culture in
the entire Country, could not emulate this behaviour, thus suffering considerable delays vis-à-vis
their enemy at the beginning of the conflict.

When Italy entered the war, other organisational dysfunctions in the intelligence organisation
emerged also because it was divided into two bodies - the Intelligence Office and the Situation
Office - which, although part of the same Operations Division, often found it difficult to cooperate.
Moreover, during Cadorna’s time, the Supreme Command focused its care and confidence on the
Situation Office, leaving the activity of the Intelligence Office/Service in the shade.
Moreover, some shortcomings in counterespionage left the door open to enemy networks dedicated
to subversive propaganda and sabotage, especially against ammunition depots and warships, across
Italian territory . It took time also to organize sabotage of relevant objectives in enemy territory
2
and to exploit the contribution in combat roles of the internal ethnic components of the Hapsburg
Monarchy .
3
Nevertheless, already in 1916, the intelligence organisation of the Royal army had reached a
reasonable level of expansion and efficiency, as demonstrated by the development of the Armies
Intelligence structures which became capable enough as to compete, in terms of ability and
professional skills, with the Intelligence Office of the Supreme Command.

1 The 1882 reform came at the end of several reorganisation steps in 1867, 1870, and 1873.
2 In the first years of the conflict, there were severe and numerous explosions affecting reserves and ammunition depots both
in the war zone and in the rest of the territory, as well as on warships in the ports of Brindisi and Taranto.
3 France and Russia formed legions of volunteers by Austro-Hungarian prisoners of Czechoslovakian ethnicity from 1914-
1915.

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