Page 265 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

U.S. A.'ITISUBMA!UNE STR.ATIOCY OURJNG WOIU.D WAR l 231

The scracegy-making Generai Board of the U.S. Navy obliged with a
$ 285-million package far che coming year, l 916. I t was crnre.red around four new
bactleships and four bacde cruisers. This was pare of a long-raoge pro posai envisio·
oing a cwo-ocean war fought by che Unired Scaces withour aUies. Ir d.id not contem-
plare direcr involvemenr in che currenr Eu.ropean war. ln che judgment ofWiUiam
R. Bra.isced, the most carefu.l srudent of America's naval policy in che Progressive
Era, "it is difficult co avoid che condusion that che board cooceived the mosr ambi-
cious program feasible wichin the limicacions of American shipbuilding facilicies
and then met:bodically assembled threars co juscify ics requescs" (Jl.
Before this visionary request could be submitted co Congress, Wilson's scrin·
genr diplomacy exrracted from Germany a promise - the so-called Arabic pledge
of ~ September 1915 - tbat passenger ships would be .sunk "ooly afrer warrung
and savi.n.g of li ves provided rhey do not Oee or resist" (Sl. Tbis German conces·
sion and che encrenched American progressive-paciflSt aversi an ro war blocked na-
val expansion for che rese of 1915. The admioiscratioo's buildup was ma de possible
only by rhe barde of Jucland, as explained above.
WhiJe Wilson was dismissing Bricish concero over cbe American naval con·
srrucrion program of 1916, Germany was decid.ing ro resume uruescricred subma-
rine war.fare againsr aliied and neucral maririme commerce, effecrive l Febcuary
1917. As a d.irecr resulr, by early Aprii 1917 Woodrow W'ilson was driveo co ask
Congress for a declatation of war.
The Germans knew that by resuming unresrricred submarine warface tbey would
force the Unired States to dedare war, bue Berlin calculared th.at in che inrerval
berween the American dedaracion and full mobilizacion che U-boat blockade would
srarve Brirain inro submission <9>. ln strategie re.rms, therefore, Germany's decision
co si.nk without warrung ali ships encering a prorubiced zone around the Brirish
lslands was che essen ce of ratiooality. lr was a perfecr cakulation based o n a faulty
premise. Germany vasdy underesrimated the American industriai and social capa·
city t·O continue supplying materia! to Brira.in and Fran.ce whi1e mobiliz.ing a.n army.
Pre·viar German naval planners had believed rbat rhe battleship was the ulri·
mare naval weapons sysrem an d that guerr~ de course was an obsolere suaregy. They
bad concencrared on building a battlefleet aod had Jaid down fewer thao 50 U·
boars, but che impasse arJudand and the cavages their submarines inflicred on mer·
cbaot shippi.ng bound for Bricain forced the German navaJ scrategisrs to reorienr
their srraregy from guerre d'ercadrt t0 guerre de courre.
Germany was nor u.nlque. Every major maririme narion had convenieody uo-
denared the letha1 power of che submarine at the ooser ofWodd War l. As Ri-
chard Compton-Hall observes in hi.s new book, Submarines and tk War al Sea, 1974-18,
the U-boars' "ultimate pu.rpose - the desrrucrion of Bricish commerce which the
Frenchjeune Ec~le, che young school of new French srraregy, had advocared many
years eariier - was en.visaged by only a few". (10>. The Bricish especially, but a Iso
their naval disc:iples, the Americans, had antici.pared "a new Batde of Trafalgar