Page 266 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

which would destroy German sea power as dedsively as Nclson bad demoycd Prencb
and Spa.nish sea power ... " no.
The scalemace acJudand had given che li e co chis easy solution, buc American
oaval plano.ers rem.ained uorepenrant. On 5 Aprii 1917, che day before Congrcss
declared war, che Generai Boa cd recommcndcd eh a c che Sccrecary of tbc Navy, ]o·
sephus Daniels should "sceadily in crea se che screngtb of che fìghcing li ne [of barde·
ships} ... " bccause of "che possibilicy of che Uniced Sraces being ... compelled co
2
conduce a war single handed again.sc some of che presenc belligerencs" 0 >. Almosc
immediately after che American declaration of war in Aprii 1917, che U.S. Navy
was forced co challenge chese cherished assumptions and prepare co defend againsc
che gut,.,.t dt couru which che naval scracegisc Alfred T. Mahan had deoounced as
crivial in tbe age of sream, sceel and big guns.
The officer who rcdirecced Americao naval scracegy away from che scalemare
of che bacrlefleccs coward che defeac of Germany's modernized g11trrt de course was
Rear Admiral William S. Sims. Ordered co Londoo in April 1917 as che direcc
link wich che Bricish Admicalcy, che Canadian-born Sims was nocoriously pro-British.
He focused on che immediate naval menace, che U-boac, racher cha.o on che pro·
speccive poscwar anti-A.merican coalicion of Germany, Austria and Japan hypoche·
sized by planners in che oewly creaced "office of che chief of naval operacions".
The "CNO" himself, Ad mirai WiUiam S. Benson, was excremely disrrustfuJ of the
Bcirish rhrougbour che war, and Sims lacer recalled chat Benson's parcing advice
had been, "Don'c Jet che Bcirish pull che wool over your eyes. & is none of our
business pulling their chescnucs ouc of che fire. Wc would as soon fighe che Bricish
as che Germa.ns" (l3J .
.Benson was nor Sims's only obscade co a successful campaign againsr che U·
boat. H e also ha d co overcome British Admiral Sir johnjellicoe's fixacion on gutrre
d'escadre. Tbis he di d by convincing Prime Miniscer Davi d Lloyd George chac con·
voy escorcs held che key co viccory ac sea. Lloyd George imervened direcd.y wich
che Admi.ralcy, permircing Sims ro form a working alliance wich tbe less senio c Bri-
rish naval officers who shared bis views. By early May che British were divercing
some ships Irom che Grand Fleec ro escorr coovoys of mercha.ocmen.
Sims's war·winning formula envisioned scores of descroyers escorting hundreds
of ships - cargo vesscls and rroopships - tO Engla.od chrougb U-boac-infesred
warers. This srsaregy bec~me rh e U .S. Navy' s policy o n 21 July 191 7 when Secrcca-
ry Daniels approved a buiJding program char would bring che navy's descroyer m-
tal co 273. Public and private shipyar<Ùi would now build aocisubmarine cnft and
cransporrs, e-xcepr where capirai ships had accually been laid down. The end resulr
was che commissioniog of a grand tocal o( 406 submarioe chasers of alJ dasses in
1917 and 1918. of wbich ar leasr 235 crossed che Adaocic.
As Rear AdmiraJ Sims ba d predicred a few days before Daniels made his deci-
sion, "che convoy sysrem ... will be che solution to che submarine quesrion. Thar
is .... ir will reduce che losses [of rraospons] considerably below che rare of buil·