Page 267 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
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U.S.  ANTISUOMARJNE STR.ATeGY DURJNO WOR1.0 WAR l        233

       d ing. and rhis  w ili mean thar che submarine campaign will be defeued" <t4>_  And
       so ir was.
           The instirution of a  sysremadc Anglo-American coovoy sysrem  dramatically
       reduced rhe alli es' shipping losses ro  U-boars, while the number of U-boars sunk
       increascd sreadily.  "By mid-1918", concludes historian Elmer B. Porter, "che U-
       boar had ceased co be a serious menace excepr ro rhe vessels rhar conrinued ro sai!
       independendy'' (l}l. This eliminarion of the U·boar rhreaç pennirted che America-n
       Expedidonary Force ro cross the Adanric. As Paolo E. Colerra has nored, "du.ring
       the summer of 1918 the Unired Srares was landing seven soldiers and rheir equip·
       mcm in Europe every minute ofevery day and oighr" . Of a rora! of 450 ttansporrs
                                                                16
       used  by rhe Unired Srares during rhe war, only cight were lost ro eoemy action < l.
           Germany's revival of guerrt  dt courrt failed  because rbe Unired Srares Navy,
       wirh great reJucrance, temporarily abandoned ics capirai ship consrruction program
       in order to send to sea an overwhclming number of transporrs and escortìng sub-
       marine desrroyers which were hard.ly less fragile or more seaworthy rhan their un-
       derwarer prey. WiUiam S. Sims had correcdy sensed rhe esseoce of rweocieth·ceorury
       naval warfare, eveo though in doing so he perhaps willingly served the loog·term
       British goal of mainrainiog the Royal  Navy's inrernacional lead in capirai ships.
           fnstead, in doggedly focusing o  n rhe long-range challenge a t tbc beginning of
       the war, Admiral Benson had missed a paradigmatic moment in naval history. At
       the war's end he was abou.c co  repear bis miscake.  He and bis colleagues remained
       mesmerized by che largest capiraJ sh.ip navy in che world: "With Germany disar-
       med", Benson 's planners in London reminded the chief of naval operacions, "there
       is  no occasion for  Greac Britain co  possess a fleet grearer than her presenr Fleec,
                                                 7
       unless che  power of the Fleet is designed ro resrrain us" U l. The barde with Ger·
       many was  over;  rhe barde with Brirain and Japan was about  to begin.


                                  NOTES
          (l)  D.  F. Trask, ''The American Navy in a  World at W:u, 19L4-l919", in K.J. Hagan.
       ed.,  In  Peace and War:  lmerpmatiom of Amuù:an  N"'"'' Hiflqry,  1n5-1984. 2nd ed. Wesrport,
       CT, Greenwood  Press,  1984,  p.  208.
          (2)  W. R.  Braisted,  Tht UJJittJ Stalt.S  in rhe Pacijic.  1909-1922, Aust:in  Universjcy of Texas
       Press,  1971,  p.  20 l.
          (3)  Wilson quot.<od  in W.  R.  Braisted,  Unirtd Statv Navy in t~ Ptllifte,  cir.,  p.  204.
          (4)  German dcclaration of 4 February 1915 quoted in L  H. Brune. ed .• ChroMk>giral HisJo-
       1) ofUnitul Stalts Foreign  R•lations.  ln6ro]amu•ry 20.  1981. vol.  l, New York, Garland Publi·
       shing. lnc., 1985,  p.  534.
          (5)  Thcodore Roosevelt quoted in T. G. Patuson -J. G. Clifford - K. J. lli8"n, 1\mt:rietlll
       Ptmign Polù:y: A Hutory; 1900 ro  Prrtm/, 3rd ed., rc:v., 2  vols. Lexingron, MA, D. C.  H~tb and
       Company.  p.  260.
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