Page 418 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
P. 418

384                                              ANGELO$ LAZAJIJS
           on  rhc  condirions  ~Lnder which  ics  army was  formed, as is  the case  wich  former
           colonies which followed che sysrem incroduced by che powers wh.ich once conaoUed
           che m.
              Tbe blocs which were  creaced  especially  after che Second World War  bave
           bridged parr of che gap aod have give.n  che greac powers  more opporruoiries  co
           influeoce and impart cheir rnilicary chinkiog co che smaJler scates. Naro is a cypical
           example. The sma!Je.r scaces feJl  i neo li ne more easily, though not complecely, while
           che grearer sraces prese n t  imponanr deviarions. As an e.xample l would like co me n·
           rio n char che Erench Army has accepced and applies che mechod of che "alli ed evalu-
           ation ofche siruarion" on che Naro leve!, whereas on a narionallevel irapplies another,
           purely French, mechod. Wirh regard co organizarion, l wo~Lid only remind you chac
           che cerms "Divislon", "'Regirnenc'', etc, have a rorally differenr meaning in almosc
           ali che  Allied  Armies.
           The role  of external  influences on  the shaping of che  Greek Army

              Greece belongs ro che caregory of srares which bave limited economie and in-
           dusrrial capabilities, yer at che same rime she enjoys  the  sad privilege of baving
           had co  face  chroughour her hiscory, for  3000 years,  chrears which are dispropor-
           tionare.ly large. To  confine myself only co  recenc  biscory,  l would like co  mencion
           chat during tbe 52 years, from  1897 co  1949, my country had to fìghr 7 times on
           her own cerr.ìtory, and each cime facing co che oorrh or co che easc. The rotai dura-
           tion of chose wars was 18 years. In sue h condirions Greece was, and still is, forced
           to rely o n a!Eaoces with otber powets co che fulfil no t only of rhe defensive needs,
           bur also of che purely milicary needs which che Greek economy could noc, and slill
           cannor, meec.  Therefore che excernal intluences o n  tbc sbaping not only of Gree.k
           milicary thinkiog, bue also on the saucrure of che Greek Army, ha ve been imporrane.
              The geostraregic locatioo of Greece, a long with her liberai aod democratic tra·
           ditions, bave led her in che pasr, and are still le.ading her coday.  rowards the great
           democracies of the west. Thus che  councry  has always rurned to  chem  for  tbe or-
           ganization  of her  Army.

           From  independence (l827) co  che end of che  Second World  War (1945)
              Greece won ber independence afrer 400 years of Tucl<ish occupacion and af.
           rer a most bloody struggle for liberation which scarred in 1821 and formally ended
           in 1827 wich che signing ofche Treacy ofl ondon. Those four cencuries ofTu.rkish
           occupation were charaaerized by cominuous rebellions of Greeks based on guer-
           rilla groups wh.ich opemced rhroughouc d1e period of occupacion in che mouncainous
           regions of che country. Those gmups formed che oucleus of tbe revoluciooary forces
           of 1821 which foughc with no milirary training or discipline, bue whose sole. "cre-
           do" was "Freedom o r Deach"'. There was no  regular army excepc for some units
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