Page 426 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
P. 426

392                                          IINT6NIO D~ )f.SUS BISPO
           aware rhnt this could occur only aftcr thc c:mpires havc bc:cn  dismantled and  thc:
           periphc:ry  problems have  been solved.
              W  e beHeve that for a  better understanding of these complex problems i t will
           be belpful ro consider the historical developmenr. Jn  fact,  a  narion's memory is
          always a factor robe considered in che decision making process in the international
          comexr, especi:ùly with regard to d1e  promotion and maintenance of its own in-
           terests that should be. ultimately, the frcedom, the dignity and thc self promotion
           of its  citizens.
              Then, we propose a very rapid ovcrview of thc subjecr, revealing some of the
           background 10 Euro-Atlantic relations, bur onJy through the most significa m snap-
           sbots, starting with American  strategie  thinking and  action.
              The fundamenml idea that is beni od rhis brief analysis is che idea of continui-
           t)' in Europcnn sm1.tegic thinking. There has been no significanc change on elthcc
           side of the Adanric, since the sevemeenth cemury for  ir  hns been foundcd on che
           same sources and has  cxpcricnccd 11  paralel developmenr. T he differcnces  which
           ha ve occurred must be cxplnined by thc specific national incerescs. objcctivcs and
           environmenrs.
              lt seems to be wonhwhile to recall AJexis de Tocqueville in "Dc la Dcmocratie
          en Amerique", published nbouc rwo hundred years after che  first Brirish colonics
           had been esrablishcd in America, co clearly see the Americnn society in formation,
           the principles chac had governed ic and co undcrsrand che specific environmcm in
          which  ir rook  piace.
              Following the dlscovery of chat new landmass in  the lìfcc·enth  ccnrury, cherc
          had been some exploitation up co  the bcginning of th.e seventeemh cenrury. l t was
          genenUy known, from successive repons made by the imrepid navigarors,  that a
           piece of land was available ar the end of rhe  vast ocean.  Neverd1eless,  whar che
          dimensions and physical characccristics of thac land wc:re,  ics  resourccs nnd  its in-
          habiranrs, were somcthing diffuse; some vague ideas abour it, nor more than rhat.
          So,  it was in fan an adventurc co  cross the occan, even learning from  ochcrs rh~
          route and,  more or less, the poinr of landing. Cerrainly, thac cnccrprise would re·
          quire a  very hard decision  and a  very strong will.
              At thar ti me in Europe the lack of religious colerance was a source of war-
          one creed for  onc cerrirory was  che  basic principlc:.  The jusc  war docrrine carne
          tO che fore aga in. Up co the peace of Wesrphalia, che  issue of religion was che mosr
           imporra m single cause of war; from thar dare a  nadon-srare's sovc:rcignty becamc
          the most salicnr value which justilìed the use of military force. The religious cause
          and che  realism  rcgarding relations bccween  srares  (che  stare of nature) are boch
          culrural auicudes that wcrc expoteed  tO  che  New World and  there thcy had their
           proper evolution.
              Within thls framcwork,  we can assume thar cwo different mocivacions were
           probably the basis  of o dccision  made co  embark on chc advcnrurc  co  rc:ach  thc
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