Page 431 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

ElJilO·ATLAJ\'TJC Rfl.ATIONS 397

warning staremenr rhat any cvcnrual advenrure. or interference in che internai af·
fairs of any Amcrican nation, would not be toleratcd.
By 1823 Prcsidem Monroe srated very dearly the key points of nationaJ srrategy:
"Our policy in whac regards Europe is nor co imerfere in tbc internai affairs of
any of irs power bur culti va re frienJiy relarions with ir, submirciog co injures from
none". And in w ha t concerned thc imcrfercncc of Europea n powers in che Amcri-
can conrincnr, hc was also very clear: " with che exisdng colonies or dcpendencies
o( any Europea n powcr wc havc noc imcrfercd and shaU not imerferc. Bue with
the governments who have declared cheir indepcndencc, we could not view any
interposicion by any European powcr in any orher light tban as thc manifestauon
o( any unfriendly disposicion townrds rhe Unired Srates''.
''The polirical sysrem o( rhe allied powers is differenr from che syscem 3pplied
in tbc America. Any arrcmpt of those powers co exrend ics system co any part of
this hemisphcre will be comidercd as a threar co our peace and securiry".
This sracemenr was a reAecdnn of the above mentioned semiment (the narinn
is weak, ir respccts rhe orhers and dcmands respecr from the others, and will devote
its resources rlfld will tO thu devel.opment of che country, un its own, hoping not
to be diswrbcd), nnd of the necd co tcU those who were interested tbar this country
hnd a cole to play in the co mcxc of che inrecnational sociecy. And che srotcmenr a Iso
rellecred a real evaluacion rhat was che extension of the conOicts ber:ween European
powers w d1e Amcricnn continent, <tnd an ndvicc co che world thar n new power
was cmcrging which the other nalions had ro take noticc of it whcn inplcmcming
thcir national smuegies for that part of d1e world. These were the dividcnds derived
from che hiddcn nnd opcn war with Briroin and France, over ncutralicy ur sca, thar
cook piace during thc lìrsr nnd second decades of the ninerecnth ccnrury.
A conccpt of defcnce from an artack coming from rhe cast had gaincd a hold.
Wich the end of thc Mexican war, which major campaigns had lasted about
one year, the strategie fronti~:rs of che concinenral Un.ired Stares had bcen drawn up
in accordance with the leve) of securicy achieved, tbc nacional objcaivl11 and the power
available ac rhe urne. Alaska carne r:wency years later as a result of trade, a potential
source of straregic resources. not as a dererminant of geosrraregy ar thac cime.
The war on thc mainland had come ro nn end with thc Ci vii War. The lessons
had been learned and the strategie thinking had put the emphasis on the offensive
againsr rhc enemy armics, with high mobilicy ano concencrarion of forces. Bue thc
debacc abouc chcse issues becomcs rnrcr nnd less innovative in the period sraning
wirh rhe lasr quarter of rhc ninetccnch cenrury and going up ro the beginning of
che prcsenr cenrury.
Thc developmem ()f the Uniced Scares in the lasc pa re of che ninereenrh cencu-
ry was ClCplosivc. The commcrc:e wirh orher nations had imensifìcd, and due ro
rhis rhe devclopment and che prorccrion of rhis commerce became an imporranr
maner. Thc Royal Nnvy had rhc control of rhc sea in che areas of America n mer·