Page 436 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
P. 436

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          402                                          ANTONIO OF JESUS  BISPO
          ro a  major power and  following intensifìed  trade with Amedca.  co  ensure access
          co che self-derermjned Sourheasc Asia countries. As in Europe, a policy of uncondi·
          cional  surrendcr  was  adopced.
              This mcanr that America's tradirional  isolacionist  posiclon  had become  im·
          possible. Thc Unired Srares'  pardcipacion in  the  complicaced wscussions in Eu·
          rope during the war had createci responsabilities aimed ar preventing another war.
          And the behaviour of the Nations regarding Cenerai Europea n issu.es and rhe pow-
          er rclacionships which existed at char time in ali thc condnenc, indicared vcry dear·
          ly char che  danger  of war was  noc  remote.
              For rhe same rcasons the United States assumed lcadership in che Pacifìc, and
          objecrivcs  and  principlcs drawn up d1.1ring  the war were accepced.
              The concainmenc scrategy ca me i neo force as a consequence ofTruman docuine.
              The Europe's imperia! age had progressively come co an end. Despit·t  che cf-
          forts of che major Europcun powers, divercing forces oucside Europe, their inOucnce
          in Africa and Asia had start!!d  ro decline. And the world had become bipolar. The
          comaìnment of communist cxpansion had led ro a global  strarcgy.  Alrnosr ali  rhc
          opposing incerpretacions of cvery relevanc policicat event in any polnt of rhe globe
          were considered by each of the biocs leadershìp. A munto.! disrrusr was always prese m.
          In such conJ!tions a war would be incvirablc.  l t was in cvcrybody's murual inrercsc
          co  avoid it, due to  thc dcscrucrive effeccs predlcred, and rhis  led  co  rhe Cold  War
          and  to  ali  forms  of indirect stcategy.
              Afccr che Second World War, rhe strate&'Y of conruinmenc hnd  reinforced che
          involvement of the Unite·d Scares in Europt'lln issues, starring with an anc:mpt to creare
          a Europt-an Defcncc Communicy, in rhc ho pc of solving che problems of rh e balance
          of powcr and in an attcmpr m bring forccs cogerher  in nn unircd front againsr che
          rhcear  of Soviet expansion.  This was  thc  firsr  page  of rhe  burden·sharing  book.
          The Marshall pian had been the consequcnce of rhc chinking  dutt conllicrs çan be
          resolved  upsrream, climinaring che condirions rhac  could  give cause co  violence.
              The permanent idea of withdrnwal from Europe, was contralilcred by rhe feel·
          ing chac che defencc of che  Unircd Srarcs in rhac scenario was  chrough  che defence
          of Wesre.rn  Europe and by che acrual fan of an  imbalance of power  in  favouc of
          the Sovict Union. This evaluation led co  che  dcvdopmcnt of rhe  massive nuclear
          srracegy; ali che machinery of rhe dererrenc hns domlnaced che chinking of our days.
          In  che mellncime nuclear paricy has led ro che Òexible response, and conveorional
          forces, caking advanrnge of che emerging ccchnologics, ho.ve  become much  more
          imporro ne chan chey were in the rccenc pasc. rhc Arnericans in E1.1rope being hoscagcs
          (or the  common defence of Western  Civilizacion,
              l  ha ve rttade this  long and generai description just ro look for  my own refer·
          ences  when  prcparing  chis  pccsentacion.  l  didn't explicidy  mcncion  some  evems
          or milescones tbac determined rhe E1.1ro·Arlantic relacions, during and afcer che war,
          sucb as:
             che Arlantic Charrer of Augusc  194 1 char fixed che prindples or che objcctivcs
             in che conduce of war suc.h as che  non  froncier  modification againsc  che peo·
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