Page 435 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

EURO.AT!.ANTIC llE!.ATIONS 401
By 1919 che Unicccl Scates had more power chan all che Europcan counuies
pur cogether. Bue chey di d n 'c dcmonstracc any desire co use i t in concerr with che
European nations. Meanwhilc, che idealism of che 1920's progressively changed
ro the rcalism of national security. The League of che Nations was n or vcry success·
fui in deterring che agressivcness of some nations and provoked, o n che orher hand,
some conrention rcgarding rhe dcfencc programs of ocher nations. The Europea n
democracies were becoming constrained berween rwo focal points of disrurbancc:
national fascism :md revolulionary socialism. The world remained Eurocentric, and
che maintenance of empircs was possible due m some counrrics rdatively strong
imperia! power.
T he economie crisis of 1929 and 1937 forced rhc America n governmcm ro
rurn iiS anention ro che internai situation. They did not pay any arrention lO what
was happening in Europe regardlng the arms race which was in progress. Only
very arche end, di d Presidcnc Rooscvclc ask for more resources co be spcnt o n defence
and begin to work in dose coopcra.tion with thc allies. The atmck o n Pearl Harbor
defin itively convinced che America n people rh a t a rcal rh rea t was poinred against
their counrry.
Dcspitc nll che starcmenu in fnvour of peace nnd che declared optimism of
che Munich Confercncc, war had come co Europe, co che Ath1ncic ami co che Pn.cif·
ic. The Uniced Stures' fìrst rcacrion was a proclamarion of neutralicy, in consideri\·
don of ics isolndonisr position in rel:~tion ro Europe. BlH before Pcarl Harbor. che
Uniced Scaces had srationed croops in Green.land and lccland, during che yenr o(
1941, nnd had acceptcd an offcr co lcasc thcm naval and air bascs in Ncwfound·
land. Bermuda, Bahamas,Jamaica, Se. l ucia, Trinidad, Antigua and Guiana. This,
wich che forccs stationed in che Pacifìc in u dcfcnsive strategy, was in o.ccordance
wich Mahan principles and wich che United Staces' rraditional scraccgic poscur~ of
noc gc:rring involvcd in European policical affairs, of avoiding che threac coming
from che Easc; cnsuring srraccgic forward posirions policy in a defensive ring; mai n·
caining a presence in che Pacifìc and escablishing an " open door" policy with China.
In scrau:gic rcrms, che participadon of che Unired Srares 1n rhe Second W orld
W ar was diffcrenr from che panicipadon in rhe Firsr World War: they participat·
ed in che: drawing up overall stracegy, chey had cheir proper positions which wcre
noc always the same as rhosc of che allic~. Thc confcrences wirh che allics wcre che
privilcged fora for dcbarcs on asscning and solving che: differenccs, and for the es-
mblishment of dircctives for che conduce of war. Direcr srracegy versus peripheri-
cal srracegy, a fronc.'\1 arrack versus indirccr acTions and aruirion, che Mediccrranean
issue, che rorch operarion versus rh e Bolero Pian, che timming of Ovcrlord Opera·
tion, che Balkan approach, che Pacifìc Operation prioriry. d(awiog up after-war
frontie.rs an uncondition:tl surrender versus a negotiated peace of compromise are
aU subjccrs which werc discussed in berai! borh during and after che war.
The Uniced Staces' str:ttegy in rhe Pacìfic during che Second W brld War. after
Pearl Harbor, was to faceja.pan with ics nacural pre-war froocicrs, ro elevare Chinn