Page 433 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

EUllO·ATLANTIC uunop;s 399
East and isolaclonism far che Western Hemisphcre wcr.e nor wholly successful as
che parciciparion in the European wars demonstrated.
With che examples of acring on ics own and che conrrol of che Panama Canal,
redifìning the borders of Alaska, the war preparadans aver rhe Vene~uela issue,
che Unired Scaces demonstraced ics dererminacion ro be a leader in che Western
Hemisphere, and tbis resulred in inrerference io some caunrries in Lario America.
As we said before, che war of 1898 bad given che Unired States a posicion an che
Pacific whkb conrribuced co che country assuming che behaviour of a grear power.
Tbe devclopmenc of nacional power offered a broader borizon for che polirical de-
cisions.
During che nexr one bundred and chirty years after che independence of the
Unired Srares, 48 inrernarional wars and 19 dvii wars [QOk piace in Europe. These
wars were foughc co adjusc che nacion wich che scate, and [Q gai n srraregic dominance.
The fighcing was main.ly ben..,een che Continemal powers; dominaoce ac sea had
mainrained disproporrionace forces in ics favaur.
As wc said, ic was during che transidon from rhe nineceenrh ro rhe rwentierh
cenrury chac the Unired States became fully aware of ics real power with regard
[Q che European countcies. The figures refering to che elemenrs af power are quite
impressive. At chat rime an internai pressure far foreìgn m.arkecs had given ics results:
in fact, during rbe fifty years before World War l exporrs had multiplied by seven
cimes. And this had meant an increase of rhe maritime rrade and more assecs co
be protected: che result was that by 191 O i t occupied che third position in che hier-
archy of mariti me powers, ali over the world. Recognition of che emergence of chis
major power a od the pressare aver che British empire, due co che situa don an Eu-
ropean conrinem during mosr parr of the nineteenth cenrury, forced the "grear rap-
prochemem", a dear influence on che rdationship berween England a.nd che Unired
Scares.
Bue, as in the pasr, che United Srares was aurside che Europea n sysrem, withour
any inrendon ro imerfere in the scrategic dispmes in the Old World. Nevenheless,
it was impossible co maiocaìn neurraliry during the Ficsr World War; che l'\lencs
chac had produced thc spark ro enter che war, after the growing rension, wc:;re che
threats of imerference an the Mexican issue and the chrears againsr America n ship·
ping. The Onired Srares very reluctandy emered che .firsr World War and became
invol..,ed in che milirary action, despite srrong pressures from ics population.
"He kept us our af war" was the slogan used in the campaign for Wilson's
reelection in 1916.
The counuy panicipated much more with economie resourcl!s ù1an wirh mili·
ra.ry forces.
Tbe Unired Srares mobilized abouc 9% of che coca! numbers char were mobi-
lized by the allies, and parric.ipar.ed wicb 30% of che aUies' war ex.penses. Ics losses
in combac were about 50 000 dead (0.00625 from tocal) and 236 000 wounded;
relatively low, when compared wich allies' losses. Bur che rraosatlanric supporc was
determinane in che success of che war.