Page 438 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

404
che one associared wirh che buroing and sinking of che America n corsnir Generai
Armstrong by n Brit.i.sh naval force a t che harbour of Hona in 1814, and w i rh some
orher similar evenrs throughour thar ~riod.
T o emphasize che strategie importance of Açores ir is rdevanr ro menrion che
evaluarion rhat che Adandc Powers made in some decisive arrirudes and actions.
One of which was the Treacy of Peace and Com merce proposed by t:he Unired Srates
inJuly of 1783 co t:he Ponuguese Governmenr chrough irs rcprescnrarive in France,
signcd 1n 1840 and rarifìcd by che Porruguese Quecn on 8th March 184 1 and by
the Senace of che Unired Srares on 3rd Februaiy 1841 . Tbe Unired Srares' main
obJCCtives in rhis rreacy were assodatcd with rhe proreaion of maririmc rude, che
free transporr to Brasil. che creacion of a commerciai exchange pose in Açores an d
rhe rcgul:nion of specifìc rrade btrween rhe rwo counrries. The lime char elapsed
berwcen the proposal and thc rarifìcat1on is a clear indicadon of the imerese in
rhe comenrs of this rreacy. \'<lirh che advent of srcam, in che nincceemh cenrury,
A{ores bccamc an imporc:1n1 coaling station, besides, its impon ancc for support
inrercontinentnl shipptng had declincd.
During the Firsc \'<lorld \'<far and pardcularly in che fìeld of omi-submarine
worfare, the Açores Archipelago was a supporr base for navnl opemcions ar Ponra
Delgada harbour and for air operacioru from an airfìeld ar Rabo de Peixe, both
on S. Miguel ish•nd.
13ut it was during the Second World War that tbc imponancc of Açores be·
carne relcvant.
The evemual use o( Açorcs was considered carly on by the America n politica l
and armed forces sraffs when no fìrm or offìcial commitmenc cx•sred about the
Uniced Srares enren ng the war. But •r was puc as1de ac t:har rime due ro thc lack
of Americnn troops ready to ser up base rhere. Whcn che ralks with British offìcials
100k piace for thc preparations for t:he war. che strategie tasks were shared. The
Açores issuc would bdong to the Briòsh. lcdand, Cabo Verde. Dakar and Moroc-
co were ar thar timt destined to be prorecred by rhc American force.
Due t o t:hc Ponuguese policy of neurrality, t:he usc of these islands for milicary
purposes was subjecr tO hard consrrainrs. From the beginning of the war, an up·
darcd conringency pian for an arrack and occuparion of t:he islands had been made
by England and the Uniced Stares, in case of noc reaching an agreemenr wirh the
Porruguese governmcnr. Even, a pian for t:he tnrufer of Porruguesc government
offìcials from the moinland had bc:en prt:parcd, this cime by Portuguese and Brit·
ish officials, in case of the occup:~tion of Porrugal by t:he Axis Powers.
After the Torch operarion, d1e use of Açores issue bccame one of rhe fìrsr pri·
orirics of the Batrle of t:he Adamic. As was srarcd in a memorandum by rhe Firsr
Se;~ Lord to the War Cabrner in Fcbruary of 1943, .. aie bases in rhe Portuguese
Atlandc Jslands would enable covering largc and dangerous gaps on convoy rourcs.
Air facilitics in d1e lslands would therefore have a virai and decisive effcct on U-
boat opcrations. T hc advantages of faciliric..os would in facr be tremendous, giving