Page 440 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

406 ANTONIO DI J ESUS 8151'0
an auconomous articude conccrning the posirions assumed by the Unitcd Kingdom.
Aod in the pursuit of its own srraregy, which iocluded the restoring of a srrong
Europe, the Açores Archi pelago has never been abandooed since theo as a military
si re ro suppon the defcnce of the Unired Stares and the defence of Eu rape, as an
outpost und a poi m of power radiacion, a poinr for the rcgeneration of tbc con·
tioentaJ powers.
lrs strategie impunance in the Arlanric link was once more revcalcd whcn tht
Unired Sratcs pur ùiplomatic prcssurc un thc members of rhe Brussels Paets co in·
elude Ponugal as a membcr of rhe Nonh Adanric Treary.
As a maner of fact, Açores is a key poi n t of supporr fora rapi d rcinfocccmcnt
of Europe, a very imporrane base far che support of maricimc operations and as
a conrriburion rowards che conrrol of sea in che key arca of approach 10 Europe,
an exclusivc intermcdiary poi m in the Atlantic foc the pcojec1ion of powcr lO regions
outsidc the Naro lLrea.
Wc belicve, as we sa id before, rhac an boch continenrs separated by the Adan·
dc ocean thcrc is a common conception of the world and a common idea about
human life, that is co sny, pcoplc on che cwo condnenrs ha ve rhe samc fundamcncnl
valucs nbouc li(e nnd socicry. The defcnce o( chese values must be conccived and
mnrerinlizcd in comrnon. ovcrriding thc non common inccrcsts of ali the nnrions
concerned. An d co achicvc chìs, n freedom of nction and an abscnce of chrears co
sccuriry in che Nnrth Allantic nrc cssencial.
\VIe think chat it is easy to suy, bue not very realistic, right now thnt it taok
more than forty years co solve the issues whìch werc noc completely solvcd at che
end of Secnnd World Wur. A trcmendous efforc has bccn madc: tu ensurc pcace
and to kecp regionnl conOicts limited, in a framework of an arms race rhac has
now come co ics end. Anothcr issue which is coming up aga in, is rhar of nadonal·
ism a t the sa me ti me as the association of srares imo huge organiunions tcnds to
lead co the inregrntion of nn donai powers so that che power of rhe single state is
limircd.
Wich rcgnrd co the use of rhc: Adamic islands we ca n see from the pomt of
view o( America n straregy two opposing approaches and a hiscorical poinr of view:
the applica don of a forward dcfcncc conccpt and the support poi n t for power projcc·
ti o n. The use of che islands as stra regie plarforms has been denied 10 thc non-allicd
nadons, so reducing Lhe thrcars co rhe Unìrcd Srares and advnnrogcs are gaìned
chrough cl1c comrol of che sea, and by granting free usc co other nacions therc is
a projeccion of power which reinforces the links of che aHied defence of Europe,
whicl1 are che main objecrivcs for rhat speciflc strategy.
Of course this has some i m pace on overall strategy; thc cechnological dcvelop·
menc a od thc Scversky conccpt for d1c projecrion of powcr from che hen rr of one's
own coumry wichour calling nn incermediare support, hnvc not drastically ceduced
the mategic ìmporrance of d1c rolc of thcse islands in thc middle of che oct'!ln.