Page 430 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

396 1\NTONIO OE JESI!.~ 81SI'O

dùs poscure, as ic was planned and conducced with spec.ial emphasis on offensive
action. Dur ing che Civ il War thcse rwo opposing theses conttasced. The neavy casual·
icies suffered in several offensive operations ha d a strong impacc on che final resulc.
But the maooe.uvre to attack ar che rear of che enemy, as weU as che principle of
concencration, are some of che key idea.s which che experience of Ci vii War brought
to light. The dependence on logistics co suppoH che croops and che logicaJ conse·
quence of creating porenrial vulnerabilicics, the advantage of considcriog objectìves
rather rhan annihilaring dte enemy armies, were some of che aspeccs for considera·
tion after che expericnce of war.
Tbc concept of coral war had emerged with involvement ac differenc levels:
the separation berwec:n policical scrategy focussing on che enemy governmcnr and
on che will of the enemy people, and the milicary scrategy wich che ai m co subjugace
a nd, if possible, co caprure and demoy the hosrile nrmy; the consideration of rhe
faccors of power based on politica!, economie, soci~tl and rnilicary rcsources, and
the requ lrcment of figbting (wnr is a seri es of cornbats) with che objecrivc ro demol·
ish rhe enemy army and to destroy i·rs will to continue resisting. "''I"he surest way
co take the fighring spirit ouc of a councry is co defcac ics main nrmy. Ali orher
means caJculared co bring dte encmy ro his knces a re conrriburory 10 che ma. in p rnpo·
sicion, which is now, as it ever has been, namely, ro dcfeat of his mai n forccs'".
Inc feeling of leaders cominued ro be rhar che Uniced Scaces was a weak na·
tion which must be prcserved from che attacks of che sttonger powecs, avoiding
politica l aJJiancc:s that, for o ne rc:ason or anocher, could create some chrea.r co che
country. A defcnsivc posrurc and a focus on internai developmcnt werc che key
poinrs of nacional scraregy.
The maritime cradc bccwecn America :md Europc was oor seriously affccced
by independence and had proceeded ics norma l coursc dictared by thc economics
of the st.ates. For the ncw country, with a necd for consolidadon an d w.ith a design
of expansion tO che west, an isolationis1 posirion, char meanc there was no inrerest
in being involved in Europea n lssucs, was che only possiblc policy co ado pc if sccu·
riry ac sea was co be assured. In facc, thc procecdon of America n shipplog was not
an unsurmounrable problem. There was piracy and some other diffìcu!clcs, bue due
co the cooperation of a maritime Power which recognized che advancages or not
getting inro rrouble with che new American country, rhere was nor ton much cfforc
diverred from more importam aims.
A.s early as 1818, at che Aix-La-Cha.pe!le Congress, che major Europea n pow-
ers had recognized che c:mergent power of che Unired States and had discussed the
evenrual dang~r thar this could represenr for European securiry. A fìnal proposal
was drawn up ro include the United Staccs in an Europea n policicnl system, in search
o( a balance of power, with the argument d1ar ics people were Europcan with R
Christian Paith and !inked 10 Europe by blood ries.
T he mosc dircct: and complete answer co chis proposal was che Monroc doc-
ttinc - and this was noc only che smremenr of non-involvemem in internai Euro-
pean affairs, the non-en1anglemenc alliance, inhericed from che past, but che new