Page 556 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

522 BE"\)hMIN f COOUNG

legions, wich an elecrric effecr upon rhe body poliric in both instances. For rbe bat·
rle squadrons of Admirals George Dewey, William Sampson, and Winfield Scorc
Schley, che lessons of Manila Bay and Santiago in 1898 reaffirmed New World
industriai prowess and new navy professionalism over Old World degredation No
down sizing accompanied poscwar navy. fuuher, navalisrs, polidcs. and che public
alike found che vicrories convenienc racionale for continued naval build·up. Ar srake
were defense of new colonies acquired fcom Spain in che Caribbean and the Pacif·
ic. Neicher would tbere be any rerurn co che isolacionist doldrums and naval slorb
tbar bad acrended che posr-Civil War era. Stalwart polidcians like Theodore Roosevek,
diplomats sue h as Henry Cabor Lodge, and naval officers chemselves aU sa w ro tbar.
Sùll, tbe Americao oaval renaissance from ics comm.encemenr in 1883 had owed
as much ro outside as inside influence, witb Europea n designs, preceden.rs, rheory,
and rechnology transfer. These fac.rs were not readily apparenr co che public, who
cared only tbat tbc navy represemed their own boasrful surging for power and respecr
in rhe world.
The birch of rhe modero America n milirary by che rurn of rhis cenrury resulr·
ed as much from tbe chrear of che O Id Wocld ro che New as i t di d from any other
cause. Tradirional enmiry and envy of Grear Briraio and her powerful Royal Navy
was joined by !esser fear fo.r France, Russia, or smaller ltalian and Ausrro-Hungarian
fleets. Most imponandy, however, tbe other upstarrs !.ike the United Srares such
as Imperi al Germany and Japan offered che worst worries. 1f che very reason for
che conflict with Spain had been Old World imrusion imo che American sphere
of influence in che first piace, chen a concinued moderoizadon and buildup seemed
imperative for deJending tbar expanding sphere beyood purdy American waters.
Germany andjapan seemed bene upon resti.ng American mectle from tbe Caribbe·
an ro tbe Far Easc, alchough lictle tbought was given in Washington to involvemenc
in European imernecine srruggles on che concinenr. No longer isolarionisr, Ameri·
can seapower advanced tbe elemenc of confronracionalism tbereby iojecriog anocber
disruptive or unsectling element inro tbe affaiJ:S of nadoos after 1898.
True, che l 50-odd warships oftbe American fleer hardly offered any profound
challenge w Europeo fleecs as of tbe rurn-of-tbe-cenrury. Only larer would America
provi de the naval rnake-weigbr in 19 L7 an d 1940141, per.hap;;. Bue, make no mis·
rake, the world wide transir ofRoosevelr's Great White Fleer was a rwin-edged evenc
- seen by some as a peace-inrending gesrure of good will and example of Ameri·
can skjJJ. Yet, ir also was seen as a warning againsr aggressioo - especially by
some potenti al enemy like Japan. Would the world bave bee n less bellicostic over
rhe lasr nine decades wichour che American naval presence? 'Perhaps nor. bue at
the same rime, rhe rise of che modero Yankee ban!t: fleet played its part in shapìng
che geopolitica! or srrategic aspecrs of m.od.em milirary hisrory from che 1890s on.
In one sense, che greatest gift of this New World navy ar the end of tbe ninereenrh
century was a person, Capcain, larer Admiral /Jfred Thayer Mahan. Maverick edu·
cacor and tbeorist, Mahan found examples for hi.s reacbing nor from tbe American