Page 557 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

THE UNITED STATf.S NAVV 523
experience bur rarher from Old World imperia! experiences. Drawing nor upoo
che lessons of his own counu:y·s naval hisrory - a srory which berrer supported
che rrench school of guerre de coyrse or commerce raiding- Ma han rurned ro mocher
England much in che manner rhar bis army comrades found fascinatioo wich che
success of fmpcrial Germany against France. Mahan found English srruggles for
comm!lnd of che sea during earlier times as che proper model for an aspiring navy
Jike his own. Of course, chis wbole plulosophy rranslated evcnrually imo che con-
cept of "a navy second ro none", to the American inpuc co naval compcticion and
arms races, as wcll as che whole application of national industriai power ro nadon·
al defense. Early on, Mahan remained a prophet berrer known and appreciared
bcyond American shores. It was from his mind chat flowed che ingredicnts for the
nautica! si de of modero milicary hisrory and che wars afloar in che cwemiech cenrury.
Modero write.rs bave suggested rhat Mahanian thought best reAecred che days
of saìl, noc rnose of sceam and sceel. Stili, Mahan sought co bring order our of che
chaos of new rechnology applied on ways in an inscirution such as che navy. The
Naval War College ar Newporc, Rhode lsland, and che Uniced Scares N a val Jnsti-
tute in Annapolis; Maryland provided the cerebra l opporruniries for ex:pression
of ideas and learning rhat were so necessary for taming che new cec.hnology. Brilli-
a m scientisr-engineers like Bradley A. Fìske an d Williams Sims formed pare of che
oew breed of naval professiooals an d reformers- modernizers really - who wor-
shìpped Mahan and bis dottrine. For old hands, ic w.as ali qu.ite troubling arche
end of rhe cencury; for others jusr che oppqsire with chalJcnge and stimularion, a od
aveoues for discourse unheard of prìor co che Ma han years. This new profcssional-
ism played no small role in conveylng che idea of a brash, confident, and skilled
American navy as a projecrion of power.
Nevcrcheless, Mahan's gospel, oavy sea power itself ar this cime, resced upon
onc pillar thac ofren cscapes notice by modero hisrorians. Thar pillar was induscri-
alization. lrwas in che period 1883-1905 thac the Uniced States became che leadiJJg
industriai power of che world. Her population rose from 50 m 84 million, swelled
by yec another wave of Old World emigration ro New World farm and facrory.
Bue, steel production provides che besc indicacor of narional industrial power, and
here America raced past borh Great Br ira in and Germany-Luxembourg, for exam-
ple. ln 1880, couched in Long rons, d1e United States rurned out 3.84 ro Brirain's
7. 75 and Germany·Luxembourg's 2.69 rons. Twenty·scvcn ycars larer che fìgures
stood ar 25. 78, 9.92, and 12.67 roos respecrively, produced each year. Naturally,
not ali the figures wem imo armamems producrion. Bur, a goodly portion di d thus
provided rea! undt'rpinning for Mahanite dogma, and America's eX"pansive
diplomacy.
Of course. ar fìrsr, America dcew upon rechnology uansfer and emigracioo
(rom the Old War ro develop me armor and ordnance plants ro support rhe new
American sreel navy. Added roo were the shipyards and o~her indusuial base as
rhe process amcricanized aod expanded. lt was nora massi ve, ali incrusive efforc