Page 110 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

110 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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was proposed to offer Italy (via the Supreme War Council at Versailles) a consider-
able quantity of raw materials for its aviation industry in return for supplying Brit-
ain with large numbers of Caproni bombers, amounting to half Italy’s output of the
planes. In June 1918, Churchill (Minister of Munitions) asked Caproni for 50 of his
planes. However, the war ended before anything came of these moves.
What precisely did Caproni and his representatives say when they came into con-
tact with British airmen? (Unfortunately but not surprisingly, no verbatim records
of any of these discussions seem to have survived). If we assume that these discus-
sions were like so many others, and that Caproni spoke much as he wrote, we can
be pretty certain as to what was said. Conclusive evidence is provided by a contem-
porary report on Caproni’s ideas which I have discovered among the records of the
old Air Historical Branch at the Public Record Office. This 700 word report, which
was made at first-hand by the Belgian Military Attaché in Rome (and endorsed by
the Belgian Minister of War), was with the Operations Branch of the British GHQ in
France at the very beginning of 1916. The report, which is in French, is an admirably
accurate and clear exposition of Caproni’s ideas, as compared with more famous
expressions of those ideas; in this report there are unmistakable echoes of Douhet.
It is very doubtful that any notice was taken of this particular report, either at
the time or later. However, it is an important testament to Caproni’s standing, to his
skill as a lobbyist, as well as to both the existence and closeness of the international
aeronautical community. And it raises certain questions: Is it conceivable that this
report was the only report on Caproni’s ideas ever to be seen by British eyes? What
about his three famous and lengthy wartime memoranda - one for the Allied General
Staff (1916; in English), one for the American Air Service (1917), and one for the
French President (1918; in French). What about the book “Let us kill the war: let us
aim at the heart of the enemy”, published (in English) in 1917? This book, which
was quoted in the “Times” and which was widely disseminated amongst US airmen,
was written by Caproni’s friend Nino Salvaneschi, although the ideas are clearly
Caproni’s. And, above all, did no British Attaché, or visiting British airman, likewise
meet Caproni, be impressed by the man and his ideas, and disseminate those ideas
among colleagues and superiors?
It is now largely forgotten that in the period 1917-18 a British Army Corps, as
well as large RFC (in the north) and RNAS (in the south) contingents, served in
Italy. This situation clearly provided a very great opportunity for the dissemination
of the ideas of Douhet among many British airmen. The last commander of the RFC
contingent was Phillip Joubert. Joubert was intimately associated with the RAF Staff
College in the inter-war period, first as instructor (1922) and then as commandant
(1930). Given the fact that, in 1918, Douhet was one of the heads of Italian Military
Aviation, there must at least be the possibility that Joubert and members of his staff
came into contact with Douhet. Undoubtedly, British and Italian airmen would have
met regularly, both officially and unofficially; and it is entirely possible that mem-
bers of the British air contingents became familiar with the ideas of Douhet at this