Page 115 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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tHe plaCe of douHet: a reassessment

together. And, in many respects, the close relationship forged during the war con-
tinued into peacetime. A Supreme War Council, consisting of Permanent Military
Representatives and a multi-national Secretariat, was established at Versailles in No-
vember 1917. Various Inter-Allied Committees (including an Inter-Allied Aviation
Committee) were set up. The establishment of the SWC brought together officers
and officials from the four Allied nations and provided a forum for the inter-change
of ideas and information, both official and unofficial. Incidentally, at the third ses-
sion of the IAAC (July 1918), the Italian delegation under General Luigi Bongiovan-
ni decisively forced the issue of the creation of an Inter-Allied Airforce to mount a
co-ordinated strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1919: which had first
been proposed by the Americans - perhaps under Caproni’s influence - in March.
Furthermore, during WWI there was a large traffic in aircraft and aviation sup-
plies between the Allied nations, and this naturally led to the development of close
contacts between Allied airmen and officials. In 1917 the Italians established an
Aeronautical Commission in London. And in June 1918 the Ministry of Munitions
opened an office in Rome. Also in 1918 an Inter-Allied Munitions Council came into
being under the auspices of the SWC; Chiesa was one of the Italian delegates. In
the late summer of 1918 a British Aeronautical Mission, led by Sir Arthur Duckham
(Director-General of Aircraft Production), visited Italy. And, finally, one should not
forget the frequent wartime and post-war Allied conferences - many held in Italy
(e.g. Rome 1917, Rapallo 1917, Genoa 1922).
In view of the above, I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that, partic-
ularly during the wartime and post-war years, a great many in Italian, French, British
and US aviation either knew - or knew of - each other. And thus it scarcely seems
credible to me that Douhet and his ideas would not be discussed by - still less be
unknown to - many airmen outside Italy, especially in Britain, France and the US.
The oft-claimed “language barrier” is a red herring - in fact, there was no real
problem. Suppose we ignore for a moment the existence of translators and interpret-
ers. During WWI many British and Italian airmen and soldiers acquired first-hand
knowledge of each other’s language: some’s knowledge even pre-dated the war.
Many of the Italians spoke English - most notably Caproni and Guidoni. Many of
the British spoke Italian - most notably Hoare, Baring, Sykes and Benn. Very nearly
all the major figures in British and Italian aviation spoke French - the “lingua franca”
indeed. Finally, one should not forget that Caproni’s ideas were available in both
French and English texts.
It would indeed be incredible if, in the 20s, the British Air Attaches in Rome were
less interested in, or less informed about, Italian aviation, than the British Military
Attaches before WWI. (The Rome Embassy in the 20s, incidentally, had a reputa-
tion for being well informed). Air Attaches were appointed in Rome and London
in May 1918. It is true that during the years 1921-24 there was no British Air At-
taché in Rome. However, during this period, the British Military Attaché (Major-
General John Duncan) also acted as Air Attaché and he kept the Air Ministry fully