Page 26 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

26 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
tH

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«persuasion, negotiations, and threat of force» ; according to a telling metaphor of
Frederic II King of Prussia «negotiations without weapons have little impact, as
scores without instruments». Therefore Armed Forces have the task to fight wars,
but are also means of pressure to avoid their outbreak, through dissuasion, deter-
rence and a limited use of force.
Considering the first task, strategists following the «realist model», stress the im-
portance of technological progress and underrate historical, ethic and political fac-
tors, and look for the silver bullet providing the «ultimate solution» to wars . This
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attitude is particularly dominant in the United States. As Prof. Corum remarks here
in his essay, «from the very beginning of American military aviation, the central
idea behind American airpower doctrine and theory has been to employ airpower
with decisive, war-winning effect. For almost a century, the U. S. Air Force has
maintained its strategic focus and has built a force with a strong common belief that
decisive victory in war could be achieved by airpower, with a minimal contribution
by other forces. While the technologies and tactics have changed, the core doctrinal
principles have remained constant».
5
Nevertheless technological superiority may not be decisive in irregular wars .
Considering these, the French make a distinction between asymmétrie and dys-
simétrie. Dyssimétrie is described as an unbalance between the level of the stakes
and of the means employed, but not so much their type and the belligerents’ behav-
iour. From this point of view, the antagonist for whom the stake is less important is
disadvanteged, because he is not prepared to pay a high price to obtain victory. In a
“war of liberation”, the “freedom fighters” sacrifice everything, because their stake
is higher than that of the foreign Power which controls their territory and has other
interests elsewhere. We have asymmétrie when belligerents’ behaviour, ethics, rules
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of engagement and means employed are radically different . Technological superi-
ority may have a key role in the instance of dyssimétrie, but it’s not decisive in that
of asymmétrie.
In the Vietnam War we saw a combination between “technological illusion” and
moral and political weakness which provoked American defeat. The already super-
technological war fought by the Americans often was in contrast with the purpose
of “winning the hearts and minds”: a village destroyed by napalm certainly was
hardly a good encouragement for that. Commenting that conflict an historian wrote:
«Western military doctrine actually conceived the utopia of a war in which, prac-
tically, only machines fight, serviced by only some dozens of men». Already in

3
H. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, 1950, p.
424.
4 See F. Sanfelice di Monteforte (ed.), La strategia. Antologia sul dibattito strategico per argomenti,
Soveria Mannelli, 2010, pp. 165-68 and 254.
5 See. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles & Practise, Lincoln (NE), 1996 [1 ed., 1906], p.
st
XI. On this subject see, in this issue, the essay by Gen. Antonio de Jesus Bispo.
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See J. Baud, La guerre asymétrique. Ou la défaite du vainqueur, Parigi, 2003.