Page 30 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

30 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
tH

15
pel them to live together» . In the last wars, «the political goals pursued – regime
change, conflict resolution, stabilization, democratization, pacification, etc. – can-
not be obtained through a military victory … While for the first type of operations
– those of high intensity – Western forces must be network-centric, following the
principles of the U. S. Armed Forces’ Trasformation, for this second type they must
be systemic-centric, given the importance of the human, social and cultural aspects
… the systemic approach is coherent with the complexity of the operational field. In
fact, Armed Forces operate together with police, NGO, companies for reconstruc-
tion, international civil agencies, private military contractors … in a human and
physical context different from that envisaged by the RMA [Revolution in Military
Affairs] and from the network centric warfare. They must face terrorists, criminals,
insurgents, ethnic and religious warriors, rival groups, etc., intermingled with the
civil population and normally in urban areas, which limit the effectiveness of the
16
new technologies» .
In conclusion, to win the “new wars”, Airpower, and more in general Western
Armed Forces’ technological superiority are important but not sufficient.

Airpower and Diplomacy

Considering the second task of the Armed Forces, it has been discussed if Airpower
17
has replaced Maritime Power as foreign policy’s main support. Traditionally the
Navy has always been considered the most “diplomatic” among the Services, the
best equipped to be a flexible tool of foreign policy; it’s not like so that the expres-
18
sion «gunboat diplomacy» was created . According to its supporters, gunboat diplo-
macy «has no substitute as a military tool, nor the air or land forces, because their
employment would always lead to the violation of the international rules governing
sovereignty, to an open gesture of hostility and, therefore, to the worsening of crises
19
and tensions» . In the current phase of international relations, «in the transition from
the frozen and freezing climate of the Cold War to that much more complex of the
violent peace», «the Navies offer to the governments unequalled means in the field
20
of international relations» . Yet others maintain that Airpower has largely replaced
15
C. Jean, Alleanza Atlantica. Gestione delle crisi e dei conflitti, in Rivista Militare, 1995, n° 3, pp.
37-43.
16
C. Jean, Nuove Forze Armate per nuovi interventi militari, in M. de Leonardis-G. Pastori (eds.), Le
nuove sfide per la forza militare e la diplomazia: il ruolo della NATO, Bologna, 2007, pp. 70-71.
17
However it must be stressed that, logically speaking, Airpower has a strict military character and its
counterpart is in any case naval power, because maritime power is based, besides a powerful battle
fleet, also on various other non military factors, first of all a strong merchant navy.
18 V. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, London, 1971.
19
G. Giorgerini, L’Unione Europea e la strategia marittima, in Affari Esteri, a. XXVII, n° 107 (estate
1995), p. 586.
20
P. P. Ramoino, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, novembre 1998, p. 245; see Id., Fondamenti di
strategia navale, Roma, 1999, cap. III, Esiste ancora un ruolo politico per le marine militari? e
Guerre limitate e strategia marittima, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, maggio 1998, pp. 23-29.