Page 293 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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douHet or not douHet. swedisH air power doCtrine in tHe 1930´s and 1940´s

When Torsten Friis became CIC in 1934 a Parliamentary Defence Commission
that had started it´s work in 1930 almost had reached it´s conclusions. The result was
published in 1935 and was to a large extent used in the 1936 Defence Resolution of
the parliament. Several influencial defence politicians were strongly in favour of an
Air Force with a strong emphasis on it´s bomber capacity. This was reflected in the
Parliamentary decision.
The essence in the Air Doctrine as reflected in the Defence Resolution 1936 was a
strong bomber force. It´s main purpose was to stop an enemy Air Force by attacking
it´s bases. The Air Force also argued strongly for the use of bomber planes against
enemy naval units, as an important part of the invasion defence. In August and Sep-
tember 1934 the Air Force for the first time trained divebombing against ships, as an
obvious attempt to show the diversified usefulness of bombers.
The fundamental problem for all those involved in thinking about Air doctrines in
the mid 1930´s was: how to prevent a stronger enemy from bombing and destroying
Sweden´s cities and industries. In this Sweden din´t differ from any other European
dountry at the time, and most influencial officers and politicians were of the same
opinion as the British prime minister Stanley Baldwin put in in 1932: “The bomber
will always get through.” Secondarily came the question wether Sweden´s Air Force
could be of any use against an invasion fleet across the Baltic Sea. Both these prob-
lem led to a doctrine which without any doubts can be described as douhetism.
Both Giulio Douhet and the Englishman Percy Groves were read and discussed
in Sweden in the mid 1930´s. But their thoughts were not uncritically adopted. This
is reflected in the words used by captain Gustaf Adolf Westring, the Swedish officer
that had the best knowledge about Douhet and his thought, when he in August 1935
commented the Italian writer: “This is just plain theory and have because of that
maybe not so much importance, but it can always be of some little use.” But in realy,
the influence of Douhet or at least thoughts very similar to those of Douhet were
very influencial in Sweden during the 1930´s and were of criúcial importance in the
development of both doctrine and the creation of a bomber fleet for the Swedish Air
Force.
In the tradition of Giulio Douhet also Percy Groves argued for the use of bomb-
ers, not against the enemy bases but against the home land and the war enemy. This
was an operational doctrine for a large power, not for a small power like Sweden,
whom likely would be inferior in number in a future war, presumable against Ger-
many or Soviet-Russia.
As a consequence of that the Swedish Air Force made specific “bombing files” for
potential targets in the east. The military planners in Sweden regarded it as certain
that the Soviet Union before launching an attack against Sweden, had to pass through
the until the summer 1940 formally still independent Baltic countries (however they
had been forced to allow Soviet military bases from the autumn 1939). This men that
the Swedish Air Force planned for strikes against the harbours in Tallinn, Paldiski,