Page 296 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

296 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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fighter wing, F 9, was established in July 1940 in Gothenburg. The German occupa-
tion of Norway in April 1940 had made the defence on Sweden´s second largest city
and the western border extremely important. From October 1940 and on another
fighter wing, F 10, also was established at Bulltofta close to Malmö, Sweden´s third
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largest city, and the Germanockupied Denmark.
This was an important shift in the Air doctrine, and it occurred without any ex-
plicit discussion. The military events around Sweden´s borders had made the deci-
sion for more fighters necessary. No bombers, how useful they might be for other
tasks, could ever defend Sweden against German attacks from a large number of
bases not only in Germany but also in Denmark and Norway. There was not even a
theoretical possibility to prevent such attacks by bombing the German air bases.
Another important factor was the technical development that during the 1930´s
had been in favour of the bomber planes. Now in 1940 the technology had shifted
and made fighters with a speed up to some 600 km/hour superior in speed to bombers
with a speed between 400 and 500 km/hour. Machinegun-armed fighter planes could
now with some hope of success attack bombers in aerial combat plane versus plane.
But to this also came a third important impuls to shift Sweden´s Air doctrine in
1940: the outcome of the Battle of Britain. The British results against the Luftwaffe
were impressing, and underlined also for the Swedish Air Force the importance of
the use of fighters for the defence against attacking bomber fleets. But in Sweden, as
in many other countries, one wasn´t totally aware of how the British victory had been
accomplished: the still hidden secret about the radar.
The impulses from the Battle of Britain could clearly be seen in the following
years. Already in 1940 manoeuvres with the Air Squadron, the elite striking force
of the Air Force, showed the superiority of the fighters in the air battle. In 1941 new
directives for the Air Force was written in the warplanning for Case I and Case II
– i.e. war against Germany and Soviet Unions respectively – including for the first
time the task of defending populated cities. When a German invasion of Sweden was
much feared in February and March 1942 the fighter units were concentrated close
to the three largest cities Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The defence against
an invasion fleet and enemy land forces on the ground were left to the bomber units,
who thereby kept one of their two main tasks from the 1930´s.
In November 1941 two Swedish Air Force officers – colonel Axel Ljungdahl
(from 1954 CIC of the Air Force) and colonel-lieutenant Lars Hägglöf – visited
Great Britain. Their hosts showed the many thing, although they didn´t disclosed
all secrets. The British experiences from the Battle of Britain were reported back to
Stockholm: “Attacks against Air bases isn´t enough of You want to win superiority in
the air. Through such attacks You can destroy some air crafts, a task difficult enough
against well prepared air bases. The combat in the air is a more efficient way, since

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Gösta Norrbohm/Bertil Skogsberg, Att flyga är att leva. Flygvapnet 1926-1976 (In English: To fly is
to live. The Air Force 1926-1976), Höganäs 1975 pp. 76-77 and 138-141.