Page 297 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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douHet or not douHet. swedisH air power doCtrine in tHe 1930´s and 1940´s

You then shoot down the crews. After severe losses also the remaining crews begin
to loose their morale.”
The big secret behind the British victory, the radar, was not totally detected by the
Swedes, however they in their reports spoke about what they called “the radioloca-
tion”, akind of echosystem in the air. Or as Axel Ljungdahl put it: “This was the first
time the we ever heard the word ‘radar’, and we were highly astonished when we on
the large operational map (in a combat leading centre) could se how German planes
12
moved in France.”
The impressions from the Battle of Britain were important for the development
of anew Swedish Air Doctrine, but they shouldn´t be overestimated. The experiences
from the first two years of the war, especially the Finnish Winter War and the Ger-
man occupation of Denmark and Norway were as important. The shift in the Swed-
ish Air Doctrine had already began before the Battle of Britain took place, but the
speed and direction in that shift was increased after the British victory.
Not all impulses came from Britain. Other important news about the development
of Air technology, operational art and tactics also came from Moscow and to a larger
extent from Berlin. Important visits by Swedish officers took place at the Luftwaffe
13
both before and after the outbreak of the war.
Among the most important news were the German way of co-operation between
Air units and Army forces in Close-Air-Support operations, as well as the system for
supplying the Air units, the Fliegerhorst-organisation. The later was introduced in
Sweden in 1942 in form of the so called “Air bases-areas”, a system that was strong-
ly supported by the new (from 1942) CIC of the Air Force, Bengt Nordenskiöld. 14
The report written by Ljungdahl and Hägglöf from their visit in Britain in No-
vember 1941 gave a good push to the work on a Swedish radar construction, a work
that had been going on since 1939. The work included several high-tech industries
like Bofors, SAAB and L M Ericsson and during 1944 radar was introduced both
in the anti-aircraft artillery and the Air Force. In 1944 Britain also revealed some
important radar secrets to Sweden, as a gratitude since Sweden to the British had
handed over some German V 2-bombs that had landed by mistake in Sweden. Dur-
ing the large manoeuvre with the fighter Squadron in September 1944 radar was used
for the first time inn Sweden to support operational control of the fighters from the
operational control room on the ground.

12
Axel Ljungdahl, En flygofficers minnen (In Swedish: The memories of an Air Force officer), Stock-
holm 1972 pp. 147-148.
13
Klaus-Richard Böhme, Kontakter med en tänkbar angripare. Flygvapnet och Luftwaffe 1935-1939
(In English: Contacts with a potential aggressor. The Air Force and the Luftwaffe 1935-1939), in
Militärhistorisk Tidskrift 1989 (Military History Review 1989) pp. 223-249 and Gunnar Richardson,
Beundran och fruktan. Sverige inför Tyskland 1940-1942 (In English: Admiration and fear. Sweden
in front of Germany 1940-1942), Stockholm 1996 pp. 35-38.
14
Norberg 1971 pp. 204-205.