Page 292 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

292 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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Air Force and the young but growing Swedish Air Industry. The Air force played
an important role when the SAAB Company was created in 1937. 6
The result of this close work between the political sphere, the Air Force and the
industry can be shown with some figures: Between 1933 and May 1939 Sweden
imported 45 planes and from August 1940 to April 1943 another 118 were bought,
it total 163. The vas majority of these were bought from Italy, especially Caproni-
bombers. Some planes were also bougth from Germany and the USA. In Sweden,
during the period from October 1937 to September 1943 not less than 414 planes
were manufactured, that is three times the amount that Sweden was able to buy from
other countries. This build-up resulted in a transformation from a very weak Air
Force at the time of the outbreak of the war in 1939 to a strong and efficient Air Force
in 1944-45. This was fundamental for the continued development of Sweden´s Air
Force in the 1950´s and 1960´s. 7
The first doctrinal feud in the med 1930´s took place between the new Air Force
and the leading admirals of the navy. Torsten Friis accepted to be CIC of the Air
Force on May 4, 1934 and only a little more than a week later the minister of defence
wrote to him about some questions raised by the CIC of the Navy admiral Fabian
Tamm. Among these questions were the dispute wether the defence budget should
prioritate a bomber Air Force or heavy artilleriships. The minister, Ivar Vennerström,
didn´t make an open choice of his own in this feud between the Air Force and the
Navy, but at least he showed some sympathy for the naval point of view. Venner-
ström told Friis that his opinion was that the roots of this dispute were to be found in
“some kind of romantic bomberviews that has tended to spread to much.”
These words by the minister could be regarded as a criticism against the tendency
towards a bomber doctrine in the Air Force, but it is more likely to have been ment
to be an attempt to ease down the antagonism within the Armed Forces. Torsten Friis
also tried, from his very first day in office, to ease the tensions and create a good
relationship towards the Navy. That work seems to have been rather successful. As
one important step he saw to that the most pro-bomber officers in his own force
expressed themselves with a little smaller letters. However, and this is important,
this was only a matter of official tactics, not at any point a concession towards the
standpoint of the admirals. 8

6
For the development of the Air industry see Klaus-Richard Böhme, Svenska vingar växer. Flygvap-
net och flygindustrin 1918-1945 (In Swedish: Swedish Wings growing. The Air Forces and the Air
industry 1918-1945), Stockholm 1982.
7
See Böhme 1982 and Erik Norberg, Flyg i beredskap. Det svenska flygvapnet i omvandling och
uppbyggnad 1936-1942 (In Swedish: Air Forces in preparedness. The Swedish Air Force under
reconstruction and built-up 1936-1942), Stockholm 1971.
8
For the rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy see Anders Berge, Sakkunskap och politisk ra-
tionalitet. Den svenska flottan och pansarfartygsfrågan 1918-1939 (In Swedish: Expert knowledge
and political rationality. The Swedish Navy and the question of armoured ships 1918-1939), Stock-
holm 1987.