Page 299 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment
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            douHet or not douHet. swedisH air power doCtrine in tHe 1930´s and 1940´s


               The history of the Swedish Air Force between the years 1934 and 1945 shows how
            fast a military doctrine, in this case an Air doctrine, can change, due to technological
            and practical development as well as other factors, national and international.
               The fast shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine especially the years 1940-42 resulted in
            effects for several decades to come, first regarding the concentration of bombers as
            a tool against the invasion fleet and not the enemy bases on land, later in the same
            basic tasks for the new attack planes of the Air Force. The stability in this shift is
            underlined if we study the debate during the 1950´s whether Sweden´s armed forces
            should get nuclear capability. In 1954 the CIC of the armed forces, Nils Swedlund,
            argued that Sweden should have nuclear arms for tactical use, either against an in-
            vading fleet approaching across the Baltic Sea, or against large troop concentration
            that already had landed on the beaches. It´s not explicitly clear whether the armed
            forces were prepared to launch nuclear attacks on Sweden´s own territory, or against
            important enemy harbour and railroad junctions. But what is clear is that the Swed-
            ish armed forces totally rejected any proposal for Swedish nuclear arms to be used
            for strategical purposes. However a few voices in the debate argued for a strategical
            devise, the so called “Leningrad-bomb”, in order to deter the Soviet Union to use
            nuclear arms against Swedish cities. But these voices had no anchorage within the
            armed forces.
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               However, if the shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine had not been taken place in 1940-
            42, the debate in the 1950´s could have been a more explicit one about a Douhet-
            influenced doctrine in combination with nuclear arms. That would have been a to-
            tally different history.























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               Jan Thörnqvist, Den öppna och den slutna militära debatten om taktisk och operativ anpassning av
               försvaret mot kärnvapen, 1954 till 1965 (In English: The open and secret military debate about the
               operational adjustment of the armed forces towards nuclear arms, 1954 to 1965), i Kent Zetterberg,
               ed., Svenska kärnvapen? En antologi uppsatser kring frågan om svenska taktiska kärnvapen under
               kalla kriget (In English: Swedish nuclear arms? An anthology of papers concerning the question
               about Swedish tactical nuclear arms during the cold war), Stockholm 2010 pp. 51-83.
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