Page 340 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment
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340                         airpower in 20  Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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            carefully selected targets. It was an attractive doctrine that avoided the slaughter of
            enemy civilians and soldiers. If one deprived the enemy of his material to wage a
            war— then the enemy would be forced to sue for peace.
               By the early 1930s such concepts were developed into a specific doctrine. At
            the Air Corps Tactical School in 1933 the faculty and students began research on
            identifying  railroad  chokepoints;  vital  railyards,  and  bridges  whose  loss  would
            impose a massive dislocation of the national transportation net.  A generation of
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            airmen was trained at the Air Corps Tactical School in the elements of airpower
            thinking that would dominate the U.S. Air Corps and, later, the Air Force. The ACTS
            doctrine of strategic bombardment known as the “industrial web theory” of airpower
            concentrated on identifying key nodes of economic activity whose loss would cripple
                                       18
            whole sectors of the economy.
                 The  strategic  bombing  doctrine  ensured  decisive  effect  with  an  economy  of
            effort—but for such a doctrine to work America had to have an air weapon that had
            the range, speed, and accuracy to penetrate deep into enemy territory, avoid enemy
            air  defenses,  carry  a  heavy  bomb  load,  and  strike  a  pinpoint  target. The  rapidly
            developing American aviation technology turned the concept of strategic bombing
            from a fantasy into a real possibility in a few years. The mid-1920s to the mid-1930s
            saw an enormous advance in aircraft technology. In the 1930s aircraft engines went
            from 500 horsepower to 1,200 horsepower. NACA cowlings cut drag and increased
            speed. High octane fuel made engines more efficient while increasing range. The
            all metal and multi-engine transport planes built for the rapidly growing American
            airlines pioneered advanced production technologies and made the dramatic new
            engine and airframe designs the norm throughout the industry.
               In 1931 the Air Corps fielded its first all metal monoplane bomber. The two engine
            B-9 bomber had a retractable landing gear, a speed of 186 mph, carried 2260 pounds
            of bombs and was the most advanced bomber of its day.  The B-9 was followed in
                                                              19
            1932 by the B-10; another twin engine monoplane bomber equipped with machine
                                                  20
            gun turrets for defense and flew at 207 mph.  Even as the B-10 was being introduced
            into the Air Corps units, the Air Corps and Army leadership proposed an exponential
            leap  in  bomber  technology.  In  1934  the  Air  Corps  negotiated  with  American’s
            aviation industry to develop a four-engine bomber that could carry 5,000 pounds
            of bombs for 1,300 miles, or 2,500 pounds of bombs for 2,300 miles. The next year
            the prototype of the B-17 first flew and on a test flight achieved an average speed of
                                                      21
            232 mph while flying a distance of 2,100 miles.  This exceeded all expectations and


            17   A discussion of the role of Acts in development of American bombing concepts is found in Stephen
               McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing 1910-1945 (Washington: Smithsonian, 1995).
            18
                Ibid. pp. 176-177.
            19
                Budiansky, p. 181.
            20
                Ibid.
            21
                Ibid. pp. 181-183.
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