Page 343 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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u.s. air forCe doCtrine:. tHe searCH for deCisive effeCt

offensive against German industries and strategic targets that began in 1943 ran into
far more problems than anticipated. Under combat conditions, bombing accuracy
was much worse than expected. The heavy bombers, although heavily armed and
designed to defend themselves, proved much more vulnerable to German fighters
25
than prewar theorists had expected and suffered unacceptably high losses. German
industry proved far more resilient and capable of absorbing heavy punishment than
prewar airpower theorists had suspected.
On the other hand, American strategic airpower, while not the war winning weapon
Arnold and Spaatz hoped it would be, was still very successful and played a key role
in the Allied victory. In 1944 and 1945, supported by long range escort fighters and
equipped with better technological aids, the heavy bomber force began inflicting
decisive damage on key German industries. Bombing Germany’s oil refineries
trigged a fuel shortage that limited German operations on every front in 1944 and
1945. The heavy bombing campaign against the German and French transportation
nets crippled the German reinforcement and resupply of forces fighting the Allied
landing in Normandy and made the Allied victory on that front certain. 26
In the Pacific the reality of war operations again proved that many of the prewar
concepts were flawed. Building and deploying and using the B-29 bomber in combat
against Japan proved to be a much more difficult proposition than anyone had
imagined. Precision bombing operations failed in Japan due to unforeseen problems
with the plane, the weather, and the lack of decisive industrial targets. By the time the
American bombers began their major offensive against Japan in early 1945 Japanese
industry was already largely shut down due to the highly effective naval blockade
by American submarines that had stopped Japan’s import of raw materials. Eager to
employ airpower in a decisive fashion, General Curtis LeMay, the commander of
the B-29 forces in the Pacific, turned to bombing Japan’s cities with incendiaries in
massive attacks. 27
American airpower had come full circle. The first B-29 raids on Japan had all
aimed for precision targets, aircraft and armaments factories, and other military
targets. When precision bombing had little effect on degrading the Japanese war
capability the Army Air Forces turned to a straightforward Douhetian doctrine of
targeting the civilian population in order to demoralize Japan’s national will to fight.
Starting with a massive incendiary raid against Tokyo in March 1945, which burned
over sixteen square miles of the city and killed an estimated 100,000-plus people, city
after city was smashed by the American B-29s in incendiary attacks. The Japanese

25
On US bomber losses over Germany see Crane, p. 50.
26
On the development of U.S. Army Air Forces thinking during World War II see Robert F. Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 2 Vols. (Maxwell AFB:
Air University Press, 1989) Vol. 1. pp. 127-180.
27
On the B-29 operations see Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. bombers Over Japan during
World War II (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996).