Page 176 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

162 WILLARD C. FRANK

France and Britain. Three such U-boats stood ready for war in Spanish waters du-
4
ring the tense days of the Czech crisis in September 1938 0 >. Throughout the Spa-
nish war, U-boats were supported by German supply ships in Spanish harbors,
just as they secredy would be supplied and repaired in Vigo for war missions in
5
1940-42 U >.
In addition, ltalian air and rapid surface forces bombarded Spanish ports,
engaged in sustained reconnaissance operations, and preyed on shipping along Me-
diterranean routes, especially in the Sicilian Channel and off the Tunisian coast.
German pocket batdeships and other surface warships spent extended sojourns in
Spanish waters where they were refueled and reprovisioned by prepositioned sup-
ply ships. Their crews, acclimated to long cruises in distane waters, became more
prepared for extended commerce war. The pocket battleship Delllschland, for example,
was poised in Spanish waters during the 1938 Czech crisis to slip into the fastness
6
of the Adantic should war come U >.
Spanish Civil War conditions masked problems that remained unrecognized.
ltalian and German submarine operations were not as effective as navalleaders
had expected, but they blamed restrictive rules of engagement rather than defective
torpedoes and tactics, which carne to plague them again in the Second W orld
7
War (1 >. ltalo-German division of naval responsibility by zones or hours of ope-
rations, as also with the extent of air-naval cooperation, seemed sufficient for the
circumstances of the Spanish War, and nothing was done to achieve closer opera-
donai cooperation when the far-greater challenge of the Second World War disclo-
sed their ineffectiveness.
French and British politica! and naval cooperation grew ever closer in the Spa-
nish war from evacuation efforts early in the war, through anti-contraband patrols
starting in Aprii 193 7, and culminating in the Nyon anti-submarine patrols, which
successfully kept "pirate'' ltalian submarines at bay, beginning in September 1937.
After years of constane British rebuff whenever French military leaders attempted
to secure British cooperation in coordinating strategies, this naval cooperation was
a welcome sign and presaged the strategie coordination to which Britain finally
agreed in 1939 0 >.
8
The Spanish Civil War complicated the strategie equations of the maritime
powers. T o strategie planners, it see~ned highly probable that Francoist Spain, which
ali correctly assumed- would win the Civil War, would either joln che Axis as a
belligerent, allow Axis forces to operate from Spanish bases, or find its strategie
sites quickly occupied by the enemy. Spain and the Western Mediterranean, there-
fore, prominendy figured in their calculations.
Mussolini, a major player in the Spahlsh war and disdaining the perceived
flabbiness of French and British will, announced to the Fascist Grand Council in
February 1939 his design to smash the French and British "bars .. and "guards"
that blocked his way out ofhis Mediterranean uprison" and into the oceanic world.
This required- ali the strategie advantage h e could assemble, including retaining