Page 173 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE NAVAL STRATEGIES OF THE
MAJOR POWERS, AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939

WILLARD C. FRANK

In che 1930s the mediterranean was che crossroads of the world, linking con-
tinents and oceans, conflicting European and restive colonia! peoples. In chis com-
plex sea che pachs of the major powers crossed as they reached to realms beyond,
while their naval bases encroached on each other's domains. The geography was
itself fraught wich potential conflict, even as the lure of destiny inade war for survi-
.val the strongest currency of the era. Within che region's complexities and tensions
erupted dvii war in Spain, whose salient strategie position and weakened condi-
don boch drew in the competing powers and affected their politica! and strategie
calculations. The compounded stresses of geography, great-power politics, and the
Spanish Civil War tested the European system to the maximum.
By early 1936, the unlikely coalition laboriously being forged by a weakened
France to contain the explosive dynamics of Nazi Germany - including wary Bri-
tain, Fascist ltaly, quarreling Eastern European states, and the unstable Soviet Union
- had cracked under the weight of its contradictions and the hostilities occasioned
by the Ethiopian crisis. Newly isolated, ltaly found a possible ally in the dangerous
but welcoming Germany, but yet kept its lines open to France and Britain. Britain,
frightened of Germany but suspicious of France, remained unaligned as it sought
to make accommodations with potential enemies. Hitler took advantage of Euro-
pean disunity to remilitarize che Rhineland, driving Belgium into neutrality. Meanw-
hile, militarist Japan loomed in the Far East <l).
In this unstable world of complex and extensive but unc~rtain interests and
challenges, darity, coherence, and decision in strategie direction eluded naval plan-
ners. ltaly' s Mussolini dreamed of forging a new Roman Empire, but pursued chan-
ging and contradictory instincts on how to chart his way among the other powers
and in what direction to expand. ltaly held a fairly strong defensive position in
2
the Alps and the Centrai Mediterranean < >, but was militarily and economically
weak and dependent on maritime trade from beyond the Mediterranean. ltalian
ambition sharply clashed against che interests of stronger France and Britain, who-
se navies controlled the Western and Eastern basins, yet ltaly did not relish facing
even o ne major enemy alone, an d certainly not for a protracted war. Further, lta-
lian navalleaders, despite a coherent fleet, lacked confidence in confronting Bri-
tish fighting.spirit and tradition <3>. ltalian admirals remained.strategically adrift .. --.